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Introduction
The local environment where a person lives can influence their behaviour, and
for migrants this is not an exception. Since the mid-twentieth century Mexico
has been characterised by its migration to the United States. Nowadays, the
Mexico-United States migration corridor is the largest in the world and by
2015 Mexican migrants represent almost 26% of the migrant population in the
United States.1 A distinct feature of Mexican migration has been the amount
of remittances sent back home. Mexico is among the top five recipients of
remittances in the world, ranking fourth below India, China and Phillipines.2
According to Ratha et al. (2016) the United States-Mexico corridor was the
largest in 2015, with an estimated outflow of US $25.2 billion remittances.
Besides the importance and magnitude of the Mexican remittances and
migration, is the fact that immigrants tend to spatially cluster at the host
country (Bartel, 1989; Gross and Schmitt, 2003; Massey, 1985; Zimmermann
et al., 2014). Furthermore, people with whom we interact either regularly
or sporadically form our social network, and a social network constitutes a
fundamental part on people’s lives by spreading information and influencing
decisions and behaviour of its members (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010; Jackson,
2010). Additionally, literature suggests that the environment where a person
1Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015.
2The World Bank, Personal remittances received (current US) https://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?end=2016&start=2016&year high desc=true
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resides can serve as a learning opportunity and affect his labour market options
(Andersson and Larsson, 2014; Guiso et al., 2015). In this line, the aim of this
thesis is to contribute to the literature by investigating the effect of migrant’s
local environment on his decisions to remit. The first chapter looks at the
local environment at the host country and its effect on remittances, whereas
the second chapter investigates migrants’ entrepreneurial local environment at
both the home and host country and how they affect migrants’ decisions to
remit for business purposes. The third chapter puts in context the Mexican
remittances and how they impact the development of Mexico.
In Chapter 1, I analyse theoretically and empirically the effect that social
networks have on migrants’ decision to remit and the amount remitted. The
results of the theoretical model suggest that migrants in larger networks are
less likely to remit. After controlling for the endogeneity of the network, the
empirical results go in line with the theoretical prediction. The most conserva-
tive result shows that by one standard deviation increase in the network size,
remittances decrease by 0.083 standard deviations.
In Chapter 2, I investigate how exposure to entrepreneurship at both the
host and home countries affect migrants’ decisions to remit for business pur-
poses. After controlling for selection, the results suggest that the home country
entrepreneurial exposure has a negative effect on migrants’ probability to remit
for business purposes whereas the entrepreneurial exposure in the host country
has no effect. In particular, the entrepreneurial exposure of Mexicans in the
United States is upward biased, meanwhile, the entrepreneurial exposure in
Mexico is downward biased.
In Chapter 3, I analyse the importance of Mexican remittances by review-
ing relevant literature regarding their impact on diverse aspects of Mexico’s
development. Moreover, the main determinants of remittances are discussed.
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This thesis contributes to the literature of social networks and migration
by providing evidence on how social networks of co-ethnics in the host country
affect the amount of remittances sent back home, in particular for Mexican
migrants in the United States. Moreover, it sheds light on how migrants’
exposure to entrepreneurship at the home and host country affect migrants
remittances for business purposes, as a proxy for intentions to get involved in
entrepreneurial activities. This is a first attempt of measuring entrepreneurial
networks at both places, the origin and destination of the migrant.
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Chapter 1
Social Network Size Effects on
Remittances: Evidence from
Mexican Migrants
Miriam Saldan˜a Herna´ndez
Abstract
Mexican remittances constitute a significant source of income for migrants’
families. This paper analyses theoretically and empirically the effect that so-
cial networks have on migrants’ decision to remit. Migrants’ social network is
measured at the host country, United States, and is defined as the ratio of Mex-
icans living in a county relative to the ratio of Mexicans living in the United
States. Using pooled cross sectional data from a Mexican survey I analyse how
both the decision to remit and the amount remitted are affected by the size of
migrants’ social networks. The estimations account for the endogeneity of the
network using ratios of past migration in 1960 as an instrumental variable. I
find a negative effect regarding the size of network and both the probability
to remit and the amount remitted. In addition, I investigate whether this
negative effect also occurs for different groups of migrants.
JEL classification: F22, F24, O15
Key words: Remittances, social network, Mexico, migration
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Introduction
In 2014, Mexico received US $24.5 billion in remittances, which account for 2%
of Mexico’s GDP.1 Remittances are an important phenomenon for the devel-
opment of a country.2 In Mexico, remittances constitute a significant source
of income for migrants’ families. How the remittances are determined has
been studied extensively, starting with the seminal paper of Lucas and Stark
(1985), which introduces different motivations to remit. Rapoport and Doc-
quier (2006) provide an extensive survey of the micro and macro determinants
of remittances. Recent studies have shown that social networks constitute a
fundamental part in the lives of people because social networks help to spread
all type of information as well as to influence the decisions and behaviour of its
members (see Easley and Kleinberg, 2010, Ch. 16-17). In particular, social net-
works play an important role for migrants, influencing the decision to migrate
and the destination, as well as migrants’ labour market outcomes. Recently,
literature has focused in this last strand. In this paper, I analyse the effect of
the size of social networks on the amount of remittances and the likelihood to
remit, relationship that has not been fully explored in the literature.
According to Jackson (2010), people with whom we interact regularly or
sporadically can influence our behaviour and decisions; these people form our
social network. A group of authors analyse how social networks affect the
remitting behaviour of migrants, assuming that migrants tend to follow the
remitting behaviour of other immigrants from the same nationality. The re-
1According to the World Bank, Mexico ranked fifth in the world just below India, China,
Philippines and France.
2For some examples of the effect of remittances see: Taylor et al. (2005), Taylor (1992),
Stark et al. (1986), Stark et al. (1988), and Barham and Boucher (1998) on poverty and
inequality; Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2007), Alcaraz et al. (2012), Hanson and Woodruff
(2003), and Kanaiaupuni and Donato (1999) on health and education; Conway and Cohen
(1998), Taylor (1999), Durand et al. (1996), Zarate-Hoyos (2004), and Amuedo-Dorantes
and Pozo (2006a) on home community; Woodruff and Zenteno (2001), Goldring (2004), and
Orozco (2002) on globalization and entrepreneurship.
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sults suggest that there is mixed evidence on the matter. In a study of the
district of Nang Rong in Thailand, after accounting for the endogeneity of the
network,3 Garip et al. (2015) find positive network effects on migrants’ remit-
ting behaviour. The probability to remit increases when the migrant comes
from a household with larger number of remitters, as well as if the proportion
of remitters in the home village is high. Aparicio (2014) analyses the remit-
ting behaviour of immigrants from different nationalities living in Spain. She
finds that migrants have a higher probability to remit and remit more if they
live among more co-ethnics. These results are consistent when she addresses
the bias induced by self-selection of immigrants, using the network size at the
province level (higher aggregation) as instrument for the network size at the
municipality. Moreover, migrants who are surrounded by a higher share of co-
national remitters tend to remit more and have higher probabilities of doing
so. Although Clark and Drinkwater (2007) also present evidence of house-
hold remittance behaviour from ethnic minorities in England and Wales, their
findings suggest that households located on highly ethnic concentrated areas
are less likely to remit. They use dichotomous variables to account for differ-
ent percentages of ethnic concentration, but fail to address the endogeneity of
these variables.
In the present paper, I use pooled cross section data from the Survey of
Migration in the Northern Border of Mexico (EMIF North) from the period
1999-2009. Unlike other Mexican datasets, this dataset provides a higher level
of data disaggregation. This allows to exploit variation on networks at different
levels (county and state). Specifically, the dataset contains information on
the county where the migrant was living in the US. Since the EMIF North
3Garip et al. (2015) use the distance between the village where the migrant lives and
the district center as instrumental variable. They argue that migrants need to travel to the
center in order to migrate, therefore, migrants living far from the center incur in higher
costs and thus have a lower probability to remit.
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does not collect enough information on the people migrants interact with, to
construct the network size I use the data provided by the 2000 US Census. In
particular, I use the number of Mexican immigrants living in each county in
2000. Merging these two datasets enables me to analyse how the decision to
remit and the amount remitted are affected by the concentration of co-ethnics
in the US county where the migrant lived.
Additionally, I analyse the impact of network size on two types of mi-
grants, legal and illegals, to account for possibles differences between these
two groups. Alternatively, I study network effects for different sub-samples
such as migrant’s level of education, type of occupation and income. I also
provide a theoretical framework, introducing an optimization model to explain
how remittances are affected by social networks formed by co-ethnics. In this
model, I consider that social networks can influence the level of remittances
that migrants send, this influence would depend on the size of the network and
type of preferences the network has. For instance, migrants in larger networks
might consider more profitable to invest in the host community than sending
money abroad. However, for migrants living in small networks would be much
more expensive to invest in a community project and more fruitful to send
remittances.
When studying social networks and its effects, there is always the concern
of possible endogeneity of the network. In particular, that individuals or mi-
grants self-select into enclaves because of unobserved characteristics that also
determine remittances. To address the endogeneity problem I follow Dustmann
et al. (2005), Lewis and Card (2007), and McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) who
use past migration rates as an instrumental variable for current migration. I
use data from the 1960 US Census, which provides information on the number
of Mexicans living in each county. Using this data I compute the network size
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of Mexicans in 1960 and use it as instrument for the network size in 2000, in
a 2SLS model. I also use an alternative measure for the IV, the network size
at state level for 2000, which leads to similar results.
My empirical results suggest that migrants living in larger networks tend to
remit less and are less likely to do it. Once we control for a full set of covariates
and fixed effects for years and states, the result shows that for one standard
deviation increase in the network size remittances decrease by 0.083 standard
deviations. In addition, when network size is estimated at the state level, I
find that the effect of networks on remittances is also negative and higher,
increasing one standard deviation in the network size decreases remittances
by 0.152 standard deviations. I also find that legal migrants receive a greater
impact from the network than illegal migrants. When controlling for the type
of migrants, that is returnee or circular, I find that for one standard devia-
tion increase in the network size, illegal migrants respond with a decrease of
0.037 standard deviations whereas legal migrants respond with 0.071 standard
deviations decrease.
When studying different sub-samples I find that migrants with low school
and holding jobs related to services, receive a higher impact from the network.
In particular, in response to an increase of one standard deviation on the
network size, remittances for migrants with less than six years of education
are reduced by 0.090 standard deviations, and those who have between 7-9
years reduce remittances by 0.096 standard deviations. Similarly, migrants in
the service sector reduce remittances by 0.154 standard deviations as response
to one standard deviation increase on the network size. Regarding different
levels of income, migrants were divided in four quartiles. I find that migrants
from the bottom quartile tend to remit 0.108 standard deviations less when
the network size increases by one standard deviation, and those in the top
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quartile respond to the same change by -0.047 standard deviations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next Section
I analyse theoretically the effect of the size of social networks on the money
sent back home. The description of the dataset and descriptive statistics are
contained in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 includes the empirical methodology and
instrumental variable used, as well as the results. Concluding remarks are in
the final Section.
1.1 Theoretical Model
This model considers one representative agent, the migrant denoted by the
suffix m. The migrant is an altruistic individual, therefore, he cares for the
well-being of his family living in the home country denoted by h, and once
abroad he sends remittances R. The network size depends on the concentration
of co-ethnics living in the locality chosen by the migrant. A highly popular
destination for migrants will form a large network, such as Los Angeles or San
Francisco. Whereas if this locality is unpopular and only few migrants settle
there, they will form a small network.
In this model, it is assumed that networks can influence migrant’s decisions.
As explained by Burke and Young (2011), individuals choices may depend on
norms, custom and social influence, members of a social group are expected
to practice certain behaviour and thus reinforce it (e.g. remit or not). More-
over, Ferna´ndez (2011) presents what she call as the epidemiological approach,
which consist on identifying the effect of culture on economic outcomes, for
individuals who share the same institutional environment but whose social
beliefs are different, such as the case of migrants.
Usually migrants tend to replicate home country attitudes, social norms,
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and behaviour in the host country, specially in large networks. Regularly,
larger networks are the more established ones and these can provide extra
benefits to migrants such as ethnic goods, or experience traditions and customs
as in the home country. Thus, large networks can be seen as an extension of
the home country because the migrant can find the same ethics and goods as in
his place of origin. On the contrary, in small networks it is less likely (or more
expensive) to maintain home country traditions and to get ethnic goods. Also,
in small networks homesickness can be more likely due to a small environment.
As mentioned before, in this model it is assumed that networks can influence
migrant’s decisions. Particularly, migrant’s decision on how much to remit
can depend on the network preferences. For example, the migrant can be
ostracised by the network if he decides not to remit but network members
expect him to do so. On the other hand, if network’s preferences consist of
investing in community projects, then the migrant is expected to contribute
towards a community project and therefore reducing his probability to remit
or remit less money.
Thus, the migrant’s utility function Um, depends on three arguments which
are expressed in income units: the migrant’s own consumption abroad Cm; his
household’s consumption in the home country Ch, which is constrained by the
earnings of household members Yh plus the amount of remittances received R;
and the enclave effects where the migrant settle φ.
Hence, migrant’s utility function and budget constraint can be defined as
follows:
max
Cm,σ,R
Um(Cm, Yh +R, φ(σ,R)) (1.1)
s.t.
Ym(σ, θ) = Cm +R (1.2)
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This model considers that migrant’s income depends on individual charac-
teristics θ, as well as on the network size σ. This is in line with Munshi (2003)
and Edin et al. (2003), who find that social networks improve the labour mar-
ket outcomes of its members by referring to high paying jobs or obtaining
better wages.4 Moreover, Wahba and Zenou (2005) show theoretically and
empirically that the probability to find a job through networks increases and
is concave with the network size. Following this, I assume that if the network
is relatively large, then there would be more competition among migrants for
available jobs meaning that earnings function will be non-monotonic, that is,
Y ′m(σ) < 0 for σ > σ
∗. Whereas, if σ < σ∗ then Y ′m(σ) > 0 and migrant would
benefit from the network size since he can be referred to a better-paid job or
more jobs. I also assume that the amount of remittances is strictly less than
the income earned by the migrant, namely R < Ym.
5 This is a reasonable
assumption, since the migrant has to pay for his own expenses abroad such
as food and accommodation and therefore the money he sends abroad will be
less than his income.
The network size not only affects migrant’s income but also the decision of
how much to remit. In large networks co-ethnics might pressure the migrant
to invest in the host community to integrate better and reinforce customs and
traditions. Meanwhile, in small networks, co-ethnics instead of investing in
the host community would like to send money back home. Consequently, the
enclave effect φ(σ,R), depends on the size of the network σ and the level of
remittances migrant sends out R.
One aspect that is not consideredp in this model, is the possibility that
the composition of the network affects the enclave effects, in particular if the
4Beaman (2012) finds that relatively established networks improve the probability of a
refugee to be employed and to earn a higher wage, while if the network is new, the probability
of being employed decreases.
5This assumption implies that corner solutions are not considered in this model.
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network is composed by low or high-skilled migrants. Unskilled and skilled
migrants may have different influence on the migrant’s decision to remit or
not. However, there is mixed empirical evidence suggesting that migrants
at the origin place self-select according their abilities i.e. negative or posi-
tive self-selection (Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005; Kaestner and Malamud, 2014;
McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010; Orrenius and Zavodny, 2005), whereas others
suggest that is not self-selection based on migrants’ skills but rather on other
factors affecting it (Clemens, 2014). Additionally, Munshi (2003) explains that
migrants’ abilities are similar across the places of origin and migrants tend to
locate themselves in a wide variation of locations in the destination country.
Consequently, it is less likely that skilled or unskilled migrants concentrate in
specific places.
I assume that migrant’s utility is an additive utility function. This assump-
tion allow us to observe independently the marginal effects of each argument
that affects migrant’s utility. Hence, migrant’s utility is determined by the sum
of migrant’s own consumption, the household consumption, and the enclave
effects. Formally, the optimization problem is given by:
max
σ,R
Um = ln(θ − σ2 + ψσ −R) + γ(Yh +R) + φ(σ + piR) (1.3)
The first term ln(θ − σ2 + ψσ − R) represents the migrant’s utility from
consumption.6 As stated before, networks can influence on labour market
outcomes, such as income level. For example, the migrant can benefit for
having an extra member on his network, since he can get a better job or even
an extra work. However, it is not until certain point where an extra member of
the network can now represent a potential competitor for new job proposals.
6For convenience we use a logarithmic utility function which allows us to preserve the
expected utility property.
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Thus, there is a trade-off between network size and migrant’s income that
can be represented by a technological effect ψ. Moreover, migrant’s income
is positively driven by his own innate characteristics and acquired abilities θ,
and restricted by the level of remittances R.
The second argument γ(Yh +R), corresponds to the household’s consump-
tion, where γ is a parameter that measures the effect of household members’
consumption due to changes in their income Yh and remittances R. Finally,
the third term φ(σ + piR) represents the enclave effect, the parameter pi cap-
tures how much the migrant cares about what the community thinks of him.
In other words, pi weights the importance of others opinion about migrant’s
behaviour (i.e. sending or not remittances). Meanwhile, φ represent how the
network treats the migrant, in other words, the network preferences. In spe-
cific, for small networks it is expected that members would prefer to send
remittances, since investing in the host community is more expensive, while
members of big networks would prefer the migrant invest in the host locality
such as in community projects or traditional celebrations.
The first order conditions for the maximization of (1.3) by choice of the
network size σ and level of remittances R are given by the following equations:
∂Um
∂σ
=
−2σ + ψ
θ − σ2 + ψσ −R + φ = 0 (1.4)
∂Um
∂R
=
−1
θ − σ2 + ψσ −R + (γ + φpi) = 0 (1.5)
Solving for σ and R, give us the optimal values for network size and remit-
tances:
σ∗ =
ψ
2
+
φ
2(γ + φpi)
(1.6)
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R∗ = θ − σ∗2 + ψσ∗ + ψ − 2σ
∗
φ
(1.7)
From equations (1.6) and (1.7) we can observe that migrants who care
more about others’ opinion pi will choose a bigger network, and also the pref-
erences of the network are strongly imposed. Therefore, the network will be
better off if the migrant invest in the host community. Also can be observed
that the technological effect ψ will be higher for large networks and this will
induce to a reduction of the remittances, although ψ has a positive effect on
remittances directly. Additionally, from equation (1.7) we can observe that
individual characteristics θ affect positively the level of remittances. The ef-
fect on remittances of both the enclave φ and network size σ depend on the
magnitude of the technological effect ψ. If the technological change is larger
than the network size, the network size has a positive effect on remittances
whereas if ψ is smaller the network size has a negative effect on the money
sent back home. Also from this equation we infer that bigger networks tend
to reduce the level of remittances. This may be because larger networks can
be perceived by migrants as more established networks, therefore, community
projects are more likely to take place in these networks.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Database and Variables construction
The Survey on Migration in the northern border of Mexico (EMIF North) is
composed by three different datasets capturing divers migratory flows from
North to South.7 The first dataset capture migrants returning to Mexico from
7There is another database, the EMIF South, comprising information of migrants coming
from the South of Mexico, heading either for the northern border of Mexico or the US.
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the US. The second one contains migrants who were caught and deported by
US authorities. The third dataset includes people moving from the northern
border of Mexico to southern areas. For the purpose of this paper, I use the
first dataset from the EMIF North which provides detailed information on
Mexican migrants from the US.
Another study that uses this dataset is Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006b),
they describe in detail the representativeness of the data: “Because a small
fraction of Mexican immigrants may never go back to Mexico, our sample
may not be representative of the entire universe of Mexican immigrants in the
US but, rather, of the universe of Mexican migrants in the US going back to
Mexico sometime in their lives, either temporarily (e.g., to visit family, for
vacation, etc.) or permanently. Nonetheless, and while there are no official
figures on the proportion of Mexican immigrants who never return to Mexico,
this percentage is suspected to be relatively low due in part to the geographic
proximity of the two countries (Lowell 1992; Lindstrom 1996; Reyes 1997;
Orrenius 1999).” (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006b, p.235).
The EMIF North is a project conducted since 1993 to date by the College of
the Northern Border (COLEF), the National Population Council (CONAPO),
and the Secretariat of Labour and Social Welfare (STPS).8 Since 1999 the
EMIF North is conducted yearly, and it’s applied in eight different northern
border cities: Tijuana, Mexicali, Nogales, Ciudad Jua´rez, Piedras Negras,
Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, and Matamoros. These, are the main cities through
which the flow of migrants move from one country to another.9 According to
EMIF 2009, more than 90% of the migration flow from Mexico to US and US
to Mexico, was concentrated in these eight northern cities.
8Although others institutions were joining and leaving the project across the years.
9After 2010 were included another 3 cities: Altar, Agua Prieta, Ciudad Acun˜a. Also, in
2009 was the first time the EMIF North included individuals travelling from US to Mexico
by air, who form a new dataset not included in this paper.
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The main purpose of this survey is to determine the magnitude and charac-
terize the labour migration flow from Mexico to the United States, capturing
socio-demographic and labour information of migrants on both, their place
of origin (Mexico) and destination (United States). The EMIF North targets
people coming from the US, aged 12 or more who are not US citizens and do
not live in the city of the interview. The EMIF North, collects information
from individuals who lived in the US, no matter the reason for travel (labour,
education, tourism, visit acquaintances). The survey takes place in points
where migrants only cross once when they return from the US, like in the
arrival gates of the bus station, international crossing bridges or immigration
inspection points. On these points people are selected randomly and asked
four or five screening questions to avoid including tourist who spent less than
a month abroad, US citizens, and residents of the northern border of Mexico.
From 2010 onwards, the methodology to obtain the level of remittances
changed. Therefore, I use pooled cross section data for the period 1999-2009.
For the mentioned period, the sample contains 71,286 individuals. However,
the question on remittances is conditioned on migrants having worked in the
US the last 30 days of their stay. Specifically, migrants are asked: 1) During
the last 30 days that you worked, how many dollars did you earn?; 2) From that
amount, how many dollars did you send to your home country (Mexico)?. For
this reason, I focus on migrant workers aged 16 to 70 that reported both their
income in the last month worked abroad and the share of remittances send
back to Mexico. These, represent around 50% of the sample. One advantage
of the data is that around 40% of migrants who worked also sent remittances
to Mexico.
Since I am interested on network effects, this dataset is crucial because
it provides information on the county where the migrants settled. Unlike
17
other Mexican databases, EMIF North contains disaggregated data on where
migrants lived, allowing to exploit any variation in different levels of aggrega-
tion. Consequently, we only consider worker migrants that reported the county
where they spend most of their time in US. Around 20% of the migrant work-
ers who reported income and remittances did not report the county where
they lived, ending with 37% of the total sample. In the Appendix the Figure
1.2 shows the number of Mexicans living in the United States by counties,
according to the information of migrants reported in the EMIF North.
To construct the variable of interest, network size, I use data from the
US Bureau of the Census 2000. The US Census provides information on the
number of Mexicans living in each county. According to Lewis and Card
(2007), the US Census from 2000 was more successful than previous ones
in counting unauthorized Mexican migrants, this enables to compute a more
accurate estimation of the network size. Following Aparicio (2014), a ratio
of two ratios is constructed to avoid underestimating small counties. The
numerator consist in the proportion of Mexican immigrants in a county, and
the denominator corresponds to the proportion of Mexican immigrants living
in the US. Specifically, network size is measured as:
NetworkSize =
Mc/Nc
Mus/Nus
, (1.8)
where M represents the number of Mexican immigrants and N the total popu-
lation, c denotes the county and us stands for the United States. To illustrate,
if network size in county c is above one, means that in the county reside a
higher percentage of Mexicans relative to the national average. On the other
hand, if network size is below one, means that national average of Mexicans
is higher than the average living in that county. Figure 1.1 plots the network
18
size at county level for Mexican migrants in 2000. Warmer colors mean a
concentration above the national average, meanwhile colder colors express a
concentration below the national average. Broadly speaking, North and East
of US have a lower proportion of Mexicans. While large networks are located
in states bordering with Mexico (California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas),
and a small part of the Northwest.
1.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
As mentioned before, remittances are conditioned on having worked in the last
30 days of migrant’s stay. Table 1.1 shows the summary statistics for the full
sample of worker migrants. Migrants earn $1,764 per month on average, and
from that money they remit $214. If we only take into account remitters, they
have an average income of $1,835 and remit $595 per month, which represent
just over 30% of their income. On average, migrants are 36 years old, most
migrants range between 21 and 50 years old and are men (approx. 90%). The
76% of migrants have been married or are still married and 75% declared to
be the head of his household. These imply both that migrants have a family
to take care of and that they are the primary breadwinners of the house.
This suggests that migrants in these categories would remit more, although
on average there are two worker members on the migrant’s household.
Regarding to education, migrants with elementary school have from zero to
six years of education, which represents 40% of the sample although only 5% of
this group have no studies. The 36% of the migrants have studied at least one
year of middle school (7-9 years of education). A large proportion, 23%, have
studied at least one year of high school, this group also includes those who
studied college or higher degrees. When migrants crossed back to Mexico, 61%
did it alone. Almost 40% of migrants crossed the border illegally and remained
19
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about two years abroad before going back to Mexico. Around 50% of migrants
held a job related to manufacture and construction, the second most popular
sector to work among Mexican migrants was the service provider (including
administrative services) with 30% of migrants employed on it. Only 14% was
working on an agricultural related job, while less than 1% had a job where
they exerted professionally. Nearly 80% of migrants received a fixed income.
Table 1.2 contains the same summary statistics for two sub-samples. Mi-
grants who crossed into the US without using any official document are consid-
ered illegals, while those who used a border crossing card (BCC) to enter to US
are considered legal migrants. Having a BCC facilitates continuous displace-
ment between Mexico and US, as migrants can enter the US as many times as
they like, whereas for migrants without BCC the access to US becomes very
difficult and risky since they have to smuggle to US and pay a high fee to
hire a coyote. Particularly, legal status can be a decisive factor determining
the migrant’s type, such as being circular or returnee migrant. Migrants’ type
is defined according to migrants’ intentions of returning or not to the United
States to search for a job. This can be observed in the last row of the table,
migrants with a BCC are more likely to be circular migrants than those with-
out a BCC. One has to be careful on the interpretation of the results, since
they can be capturing migrant’s return intentions to the United States, rather
than migrant’s legal status.10
Regarding the principal differences between legal and illegal migrants are
the income and amount of remittances. Table 1.2 shows that illegal migrants
earn on average US$300 less than legal migrants. Additionally, illegal migrants
remit just above US$100 more than than legal migrants do per month. Gen-
erally, illegal migrants tend to be unmarried young males between 21-40 years
10The distinction between return intentions and legal status’ effects are detailed in the
next section.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics for Worker Migrants
Full Sample
Mean SD
Remittances 214.21 409.22
Income 1763.31 1048.86
Age 36.44 10.91
Age 16-20 0.05 0.21
Age 21-30 0.30 0.46
Age 31-40 0.32 0.47
Age 41-50 0.23 0.42
Age 51-60 0.08 0.28
Age 61-70 0.02 0.15
Male 0.88 0.32
Married 0.76 0.43
Household head 0.75 0.43
Elementary Sch. 0.40 0.49
Middle Sch. 0.36 0.48
High Sch. 0.23 0.42
No. Household workers 2.00 1.40
Cross alone 0.61 0.49
Illegal migrant 0.37 0.48
Yrs of last trip 2.11 3.67
Paycheck worker 0.78 0.41
Agricultural Job 0.14 0.35
Industry Job 0.52 0.50
Services Job 0.30 0.46
Professional Job 0.03 0.18
N 26547
Source: EMIF 1999-2009, own elaboration.
Notes: The sample is composed of migrants between 16-70 years old who worked in the last 30 days of their
stay in US. Remittances records the amount of money sent back home in a month. Similarly, Income is
the amount earned in a month. Age, Number of household workers, and Years of last trip are continuous
variables, the rest are dichotomous. Age is divided in 6 categories. Elementary school refers to migrants
with 0-6 years of education, those with 7-9 are in Middle school category, and High school records those
who have more than 10 years of education. Cross alone takes value of 1 if the migrant goes back to Mexico
alone and 0 if he goes with any relative. Illegal takes value of 1 if the migrant crossed the border without a
legal document and 0 if he crossed the border with a valid document. Paycheck takes value of 1 if migrant
received a fixed income, 0 otherwise. Agricultural, Industry, Services an Professional jobs categories record
the sector where migrants were working in United States.
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old, while legal migrants have an average age of 40 years old and almost 85%
are or were married. Broadly speaking, legal migrants are more educated than
illegals. Finally, illegal migrants spend twice the time abroad than legals, and
illegals return to Mexico accompanied with family members.
1.3 Empirical Methodology and Results
This section first introduces the approach to estimate the causal effects of net-
work size on remittances and then present the results. The analysis of network
effects on remittances requires the use of an instrumental variable to account
for the possible endogeneity of the network. The specific concern is that indi-
viduals tend to self-select across locations where co-ethnics migrate or live. As
an instrument for the current network size, historical rates of Mexican migra-
tion are used. New migrants are attracted to places where other co-nationals
have migrated to in the past, because they share the same cultural background
or are influenced by more experienced migrants. Therefore, these past patterns
of migration are highly correlated with current migration but unlikely to be
correlated with economic shocks, unemployment rates, or migrants’ decisions
to remit. Thus, the underlying assumption is that past migration rates are
correlated with migrants’ decisions to send money back home only through
their relationship with the current network size.
Many authors have used past migration rates to instrument for current
migration. Kapur (2004), Dustmann et al. (2005), and Lewis and Card (2007)
study the effect of immigration on resident labour market outcomes. As in this
case, current migration is a possible endogenous variable that may be driven by
unobserved local characteristics and which also affect the outcome of interest,
remittances. Dustmann et al. (2005), propose as a possible solution to use
24
historic settlement patterns to instrument for migration flows. They argue
that migrant networks are formed because migrants tend to settle in areas
with a high concentration of migrants since they look for the same cultural
and linguistic background. Therefore, they argue that migrant networks are
determined by historical settlement patterns instead of economic shocks. In
their analysis of the impact of migration on the labour market of resident
workers, they used three and four period lags of the endogenous variable (ratio
of immigrants to native population) to instrument for current migration in
Britain. While Lewis and Card (2007), instrument the fraction of immigrants
in the standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA), with both the fraction
of immigrants in 1970 and its square at the same level SMSA.
Another paper that used past migration as an instrument is McKenzie
and Rapoport (2007). Using Mexican data, they study the effect of migration
networks (formed by the proportion of individuals in the community who have
ever migrated to the US) on both household migration decisions and inequality.
McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) instrument for unobserved community factors
correlated with both household migration decisions and inequality. To account
for unobserved community shocks that would affect migration to US, such
as rainfall, they use the US migration rates for 1924 and 1955-59 at state
level for sending communities in Mexico, as instrumental variables for current
migration.
In line with these papers, I use data from the Inter-University Consortium
for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) 2896 data file, which contains his-
torical information of decennial US county and state data collected by the US
Bureau of the Census to construct the instrumental variable. I assume that
past migration affects current migration which in turn affects remittances, but
past migration is not correlated with local unobserved characteristics affect-
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ing remittances. Using the Census from 1960, the instrumental variable is
constructed in the same fashion as our variable of interest, the network size.
I use the number of Mexicans immigrants living in each county in 1960 and
computing the two ratios aforementioned.11
As described above, a 2SLS estimation is the best model that suits the
data. Hence, the equations to estimate are the following:
Network2000i,c = γ0 + γ1Network
1960
i,c + γ2Xi +Ds +Dt + µi,c (1.9)
Yi,c = β0 + β1 ̂Network2000i,c + β2Xi +Ds +Dt + εi,c (1.10)
where i indexes individuals, living in county c. The focus of the paper is on how
the level of remittances (and the probability to remit) Yi,c, is related to the size
of the network, which accounts for the proportion of Mexicans living in county
c relative to the national average. The migrants’ socio-demographic charac-
teristics are included in vector X, containing the migrant’s gender, groups
of age, marital status, the number of worker households, and the number of
years the migrant spent abroad in his last trip. The vector also includes dum-
mies if the migrant was the head of his household and if the migrant cross
back alone. It is expected that migrants who are males, have around 30-50
years old, married or household heads remit more. Similarly, migrants going
back to Mexico alone are expected to remit more because their families are
in Mexico. However, if the number of working household members increase
it is likely that migrants send less money home. In the case of years of the
last trip it is expected a negative relation with the level of remittances, more
11In this case, I impute zero for each county where there was no information of the number
of Mexicans living in it. Since in 2000 the proportion of Mexicans living in counties where
data was unavailable in 1960 is very low, and it is very likely that missing values mean that
there were no Mexicans living in those counties in the sixties. Therefore, assigning zero to
these counties should not affect the estimations.
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experienced migrants are more likely to settle abroad and have plans to bring
family members with them. The vectors Ds and Dt correspond to a set of
state and time dummies, that account for omitted variables, such as unem-
ployment rates across states and economic shocks/crisis. In some estimations,
the interaction of these vectors is included. As usual the error term is given
by ε.
Although the theoretical model suggests a quadratic relationship between
the network size and the remittances, in practice this was not the case for Mex-
ico. The theoretical model is based on what others papers have found about
the relationship of social networks and labour market outcomes, however, not
all cultures are the same. For one thing, people from different countries might
behave differently, moreover, economic, cultural, and social factors can play
a different role across countries. Since the Mexican data did not support the
theory of non-linear relationship, a linear model is estimated.
Table 1.3 reports the results for the baseline estimations with different
control variables. In brackets are the standardized coefficients to illustrate the
effect that the nework size has on remittances. The remittances are in logs
and capture positive and zero remittances.12 Columns (1), (3), and (5) show
the OLS results, and columns (2), (4), and (6) present the same models but
for IV, treating the network size as endogenous.13 According to Abadie et al.
(2017), all estimations are clustered at county level since quite a few of the
counties are not in the sample.
Overall the effect of the network size is negative, and OLS results show a
lower coefficient for the network size than the IV estimations. The standard-
ized coefficients are shown in brackets, from these it is observed the relative
12I compute the natural logarithm of remittances and assigned arbitrarily a very small
value for those observations where the level of remittances was zero.
13According to the critical values by Stock and Yogo (2005), we reject the null of weak
instruments for all IV regressions.
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Table 1.3: Estimations for the effect of Networks on Remittances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Network Size -0.112∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗
[-0.078] [-0.088] [-0.087] [-0.099] [-0.086] [-0.096]
(0.0269) (0.0281) (0.0286) (0.0299) (0.0306) (0.0317)
Age 21-30 0.241∗∗ 0.241∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.246∗∗
[0.037] [0.037] [0.040] [0.040] [0.038] [0.038]
(0.1002) (0.0995) (0.1035) (0.1028) (0.1003) (0.0991)
Age 31-40 0.185 0.185 0.236∗ 0.236∗ 0.216∗ 0.216∗
[0.029] [0.029] [0.037] [0.037] [0.034] [0.034]
(0.1357) (0.1349) (0.1364) (0.1354) (0.1295) (0.1280)
Age 41-50 -0.132 -0.132 -0.069 -0.069 -0.071 -0.071
[-0.019] [-0.019] [-0.010] [-0.010] [-0.010] ] [-0.010]
(0.1618) (0.1612) (0.1549) (0.1543) (0.1494) (0.1481)
Age 51-60 -0.230∗ -0.226∗ -0.197∗ -0.193∗ -0.207∗ -0.203∗
[-0.021] [-0.021] [-0.018] [-0.018] [-0.019] [-0.019]
(0.1181) (0.1179) (0.1130) (0.1130) (0.1099) (0.1094)
Age 61-70 -0.352∗∗ -0.347∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ -0.405∗∗∗ -0.400∗∗∗
[-0.018] [-0.01] [-0.021] [-0.020] [-0.021] [-0.020]
(0.1502) (0.1498) (0.1458) (0.1456) (0.1445) (0.1436)
Male 0.800∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗
[0.086] [0.085] [0.073] [0.072] [0.071] [0.071]
(0.0718) (0.0716) (0.0680) (0.0677) (0.0682) (0.0676)
Married 0.103∗ 0.102∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
[0.015] [0.015] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
(0.0544) (0.0540) (0.0525) (0.0521) (0.0522) (0.0516)
HH head 0.032 0.033 -0.024 -0.024 -0.015 -0.015
[0.005] [0.005] [-0.003] [-0.003] [-0.002] [-0.002]
(0.0544) (0.0542) (0.0534) (0.0530) (0.0515) (0.0510)
Go back alone 0.644∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗
[0.106] [0.106] [0.105] [0.105]
(0.0781) (0.0779) (0.0799) (0.0792)
N HH workers -0.014 -0.015 -0.012 -0.012
[-0.007] [-0.007] [-0.006] [-0.006]
(0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0221) (0.0220)
Yrs last trip -0.044∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
[-0.054] [-0.054] [-0.058] [-0.058]
(0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0090) (0.0089)
N 26547 26547 26547 26547 26547 26547
R2 0.052 0.052 0.065 0.065 0.089 0.089
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*State FE No No No No Yes Yes
F 176.796 177.064 180.369
Source: EMIF 1999-2009. Notes: The sample is composed of migrants between 16-70 years old who worked
in the last 30 days of their stay in US. The dependent variable, remittances, records the amount of money
sent back home in a month and is measured in logs. Network size is a ratio of two ratios, the proportion
of Mexicans in a given county over the proportion of Mexicans in US. The omitted age group is migrants
between 16-20 years old. The control variables are as described in Table 1.1. Standardized coefficients are
in brackets. Year fixed effects contain dummies for the years contemplated on the EMIF. State fixed effects
only contain dummies for the states with counties where migrants reported to live. For the Year*State fixed
effects, each year is multiplied by each state. IV regressions are instrumented with the Mexican network size
at county level in 1960. The instrument is constructed in the same fashion as the variable of interest, using
data from the US Census. First-stage F-statistics are reported at the end of the table. Standard errors are
clustered at county level for all regressions and in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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strength of association of the network size to remittances. In particular, the
network size and migrant’s gender have the strongest effect on remittances, fol-
lowed by the number of years spent abroad in the last trip. Column 1 shows
that one standard deviation increase in the network size leads to a 0.078 stan-
dard deviation decrease in remittances, holding other variables constant. If
more covariates are added into the estimation this effect is higher (column 3).
But, there is no significant change if fixed effects accounting for unobservables
by Year*State are introduced. For the corresponding IV estimations, all reflect
a slightly higher impact on remittances. As a result of one standard deviation
increase in the network size we can expect a decrease in remittances by 0.099
standard deviations for the estimation with the full set of covariates (column
4), and a decrease of 0.096 standard deviations when considering Year*State
fixed effects. Regarding the endogeneity of the network, the Hausman test is
performed for the three estimations.14 The null of all regressors are exogenous
is rejected at least at the 10% significance level for the estimations. Thus, IV
estimates show that the OLS results underestimate the effect of the network
size on remittances.
Additionally, the control variables show the expected signs, with the ex-
ception of being a household head. We can observe a non-linear effect across
the ranges of age, although the 41-50 years old category is not statistically sig-
nificant. Broadly speaking, males tend to remit above 65% more than females,
as well as migrants who have had or have a partner remit around 18% more
than single migrants. Following intuition, going back to Mexico alone sug-
gest that migrant’s family is in the home country and migrants tend to remit
around 64% more than migrants going back with their families. Furthermore,
migrants who stay longer in the US tend to remit less, one more year abroad
14Hausman test is not reported in the table.
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decreases the remittances by 4.7%. Although an increase in the number of
working household members decreases the level of remittances, it is not sta-
tistically significant. Surprisingly, being head of the house have a negative
impact on remittances in two of the specifications (columns 3-6) and positive
in the other (columns 1-2), however, these are not statistically different from
zero.
Equation (1.10) is also estimated for the probability to remit. Table 1.4
shows the same estimations described above, but the dependant variable, Yi,c,
takes the value of one if the migrant sent remittances in the last 30 days of
work, and zero if the migrant did not. The estimations show average marginal
effects and the results are similar to the one previously analysed. OLS and
IV estimations show negative a effect of the network size on the likelihood to
remit and all variables have signs as expected, with the exception of household
head. Probit and IV results show similar results, according to the estimation
of column 4, on average, migrants are 2.4% less likely to remit if the network
size increases by one point.15
Some migrants’ individual and labour characteristics like, education, occu-
pation, and income are not included as part of the control sets. The principal
reason to exclude them from the baseline estimations is because these controls
are likely to be a function of network effects themselves. The level of educa-
tion, the type of occupation and amount of earnings can determine migrants’
capacity to remit. In regressions not reported in this paper, I find that includ-
ing these endogenous controls reduces the effect of networks on remittances
(in the case of income by half). Although the coefficient of the network size is
still negative and statistically significant. An alternative method is to analyse
the effect of networks on different sub-samples of these endogenous variables.
15These results are quite similar to marginal effects at the mean.
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Table 1.4: AME - Estimations for the effect of Networks on the Probability to
Remit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Prob.IV Probit Prob.IV Probit Prob.IV
Network Size -0.018∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0062) (0.0051) (0.0063) (0.0053) (0.0065)
Age 21-30 0.040∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0161) (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0154)
Age 31-40 0.033 0.033 0.041∗ 0.041∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.039∗∗
(0.0213) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0210) (0.0201) (0.0199)
Age 41-50 -0.012 -0.012 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0243) (0.0242)
Age 51-60 -0.026 -0.025 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019
(0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0182) (0.0183)
Age 61-70 -0.047∗ -0.045∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.052∗∗
(0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0234) (0.0235)
Male 0.130∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0108)
Married 0.019∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0082)
HH Head -0.002 -0.002 -0.011 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008
(0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0086) (0.0085)
Go back alone 0.095∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0130) (0.0130)
N HH workers -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0037) (0.0038)
Yrs last trip -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015)
N 26532 26532 26532 26532 26454 26454
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*State No No No No Yes Yes
Source: EMIF 1999-2009. Notes: The sample is composed of migrants between 16-70 years old who worked
in the last 30 days of their stay in US. The dependent variable equals 1 if migrant send remittances back
home, 0 otherwise. Network size is a ratio of two ratios, the proportion of Mexicans in a given county over
the proportion of Mexicans in US. The omitted age group is migrants between 16-20 years old. The control
variables are as described in Table 1.1. Year fixed effects contain dummies for the years contemplated on
the EMIF. State fixed effects only contain dummies for the states with counties where migrants reported to
live. For the Year*State fixed effects, each year is multiplied by each state. Standard errors are clustered
at county level for all regressions. IV regressions are instrumented with the Mexican network size at county
level in 1960. The instrument is constructed in the same fashion as the variable of interest, using data from
the US Census. First-stage F-statistics are reported at the end of the table. Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Estimations for the effect of Networks on Remittances by Education
Levels
Elementary Middle High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Network Size -0.109∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗
[-0.068] [-0.090] [-0.085] [-0.096] [-0.066] [-0.065]
(0.0379) (0.0344) (0.0412) (0.0467) (0.0223) (0.0249)
Age 21-30 0.289∗ 0.289∗∗ 0.037 0.037 0.485∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗
(0.1468) (0.1458) (0.1378) (0.1368) (0.1613) (0.1599)
Age 31-40 0.444∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ -0.220 -0.219 0.437∗∗ 0.436∗∗
(0.1549) (0.1539) (0.1466) (0.1454) (0.2123) (0.2104)
Age 41-50 0.038 0.040 -0.734∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ 0.424∗ 0.424∗
(0.1888) (0.1874) (0.2445) (0.2432) (0.2260) (0.2244)
Age 51-60 -0.196 -0.190 -0.803∗∗∗ -0.799∗∗∗ 0.413∗ 0.421∗
(0.1593) (0.1575) (0.2169) (0.2157) (0.2176) (0.2164)
Age 61-70 -0.309∗ -0.301∗ -0.732∗∗ -0.731∗∗ 0.008 0.016
(0.1677) (0.1663) (0.3693) (0.3664) (0.2745) (0.2739)
Male 0.913∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗
(0.1140) (0.1147) (0.1087) (0.1068) (0.1111) (0.1099)
Married 0.249∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.011 0.023 0.022
(0.0781) (0.0775) (0.0837) (0.0827) (0.0855) (0.0850)
HH head -0.019 -0.018 0.125 0.124 0.014 0.016
(0.0891) (0.0888) (0.0918) (0.0912) (0.0886) (0.0883)
N 10702 10702 9608 9608 6237 6237
R2 0.058 0.058 0.069 0.069 0.051 0.051
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 142.08 310.98 136.96
Source: EMIF 1999-2009. Notes: The sample is composed of migrants between 16-70 years old who worked
in the last 30 days of their stay in US. Elementary sample contains migrants who have six or less years of
education, as well as those who did not studied. Middle contemplates individuals who had between seven
and nine years of education. High contains migrants with 10 years of education or more. The dependent
variable, remittances, records the amount of money sent back home in a month and is measured in logs.
Network size is a ratio of two ratios, the proportion of Mexicans in a given county over the proportion of
Mexicans in US. The omitted age group is migrants between 16-20 years old. The control variables are as
described in Table 1.1. Year fixed effects contain dummies for the years contemplated on the EMIF. State
fixed effects only contain dummies for the states with counties where migrants reported to live. For the
Year*State fixed effects, each year is multiplied by each state. Standard errors are clustered at county level
for all regressions. IV regressions are instrumented with the Mexican network size at county level in 1960.
The instrument is constructed in the same fashion as the variable of interest, using data from the US Census.
First-stage F-statistics are reported at the end of the table. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Estimations for the effect of Networks on Remittances by Occupa-
tion
Agricultural Industry Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Network Size -0.062 -0.101∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗
[0.037] [0.070] [0.054] [0.064] [0.111] [0.106]
(0.0512) (0.0585) (0.0292) (0.0331) (0.0212) (0.0207)
Age 21-30 0.032 0.031 0.326∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.204 0.204
(0.2153) (0.2134) (0.1126) (0.1120) (0.1397) (0.1381)
Age 31-40 0.037 0.039 0.158 0.158 0.308∗ 0.310∗
(0.2071) (0.2051) (0.1652) (0.1644) (0.1643) (0.1622)
Age 41-50 -0.020 -0.019 -0.289 -0.289 0.080 0.082
(0.2521) (0.2500) (0.1920) (0.1913) (0.1729) (0.1715)
Age 51-60 -0.440∗ -0.432∗ -0.303∗ -0.302∗ -0.038 -0.033
(0.2488) (0.2456) (0.1594) (0.1586) (0.1767) (0.1758)
Age 61-70 -0.661∗∗ -0.651∗∗ -0.236 -0.235 -0.224 -0.218
(0.2917) (0.2896) (0.1949) (0.1938) (0.2098) (0.2083)
Male 0.055 0.044 0.770∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗
(0.2740) (0.2726) (0.1279) (0.1270) (0.0851) (0.0848)
Married 0.096 0.092 0.161∗ 0.160∗ -0.012 -0.013
(0.1483) (0.1469) (0.0911) (0.0907) (0.0838) (0.0831)
HH head 0.130 0.139 0.002 0.001 0.033 0.035
(0.1377) (0.1372) (0.0980) (0.0976) (0.0717) (0.0714)
N 3821 3821 13766 13766 8960 8960
R2 0.048 0.048 0.056 0.056 0.055 0.055
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 109.538 226.420 176.413
Source: EMIF 1999-2009. Notes: The sample is composed of migrants between 16-70 years old who worked
in the last 30 days of their stay in US. Agricultural sample contains migrants whose jobs where related to
agricultural activities. Industry sample, contemplates individuals who worked in manufacture and construc-
tion related jobs. Services refers to migrants who worked on the tertiary sector including those holding an
administrative job. The dependent variable, remittances, records the amount of money sent back home in
a month and is measured in logs. Network size is a ratio of two ratios, the proportion of Mexicans in a
given county over the proportion of Mexicans in US. The omitted age group is migrants between 16-20 years
old. The control variables are as described in Table 1.1. Year fixed effects contain dummies for the years
contemplated on the EMIF. State fixed effects only contain dummies for the states with counties where
migrants reported to live. For the Year*State fixed effects, each year is multiplied by each state. Standard
errors are clustered at county level for all regressions. IV regressions are instrumented with the Mexican
network size at county level in 1960. The instrument is constructed in the same fashion as the variable
of interest, using data from the US Census. First-stage F-statistics are reported at the end of the table.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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I report in Table 1.5 OLS and IV estimations for three different education
levels, Elementary, Middle, and High. Migrants who have between zero and six
years of education are in the elementary level (columns 1-2), those in middle
education (columns 3-4) have from seven to nine years of education, finally
migrants with more than ten years of education correspond to the group high
(columns 5-6). From the network size standardized coefficients we observe a
higher effect of networks from migrants with middle school. The IV estimations
from column 4 suggests a 0.096 standard deviation decrease on the amount
of remittances if the network size increases by one standard deviation. A
similar effect occurs for migrants with less than six years of education, by
one standard deviation increase on the network size it is expected a reduction
of 0.090 standard deviations on remittances. The network size have a minor
effect on remittances from migrants with high level of education, although this
effect is still high 0.065. Overall, the effect of network size on remittances is
stronger for migrants with lower level of education.
Table 1.6 reports estimations for the type of sectors where migrants worked.
The industry group includes migrants who hold a job related to construction
and manufacture, the services group contemplates those who worked as ad-
ministrative, provided services, or developed as professionals in their area.
Finally, migrants with jobs related to farm and field activities are grouped
in agricultural. Migrants in the group services are the most affected by the
network size, for the IV estimations in column 6 an increase in one standard
deviation of network size decreases remittances by 0.106 standard deviations.
Agricultural and industry groups have similar but lower effects with -0.070
and -0.064 standard deviation changes on remittances, respectively.
In order to analyse the effect of network size on income and remittances,
I divide the sample in four quantiles according to migrants’ income reported
34
for the last 30 days of work. The OLS and IV estimations are reported in
Table 1.7, from the results of the first row we can observe that migrants in
different quartiles are affected differently from the network size and there is no
clear relationship. In the first quartile one standard deviation increase in the
network leads to a decrease of 0.108 in remittances. For the second quartile,
this effect is reduced by half, although it is not statistically significant. On
the third quartile, one standard deviation increase in the network size has a
decrease in remittances of 0.085 standard deviations, while for the top quantile
is 0.047 standard deviations.
Furthermore, I analyse two types of migrants, legals and illegals. As de-
scribed before, legals an illegal migrants might have different opportunities or
benefits from the easiness (difficulty) of crossing the border. The aim of intro-
ducing these two groups is to look for possible differences that networks might
have according migrant’s legal status. Moreover, we also need to consider that
legal status can be capturing the effect of returnees or circular migrants rather
than their legal status. For this reason, I also control for the type of migrant,
circular or returnee.16 The OLS and IV results for illegal and legal migrants
are given in columns 1-4 and 5-8, respectively, of Table 1.8. From OLS and IV
estimates we can observe the same decreasing pattern on the effect of the net-
work size, although the effect of network size is bigger for legal migrants than
for illegal. One standard deviation increase in the network size has a reduction
of 0.038 standard deviations on remittances for illegal migrants, whereas for
legal migrants this reduction is 0.071.
About the concern of capturing migrants’ return intentions rather than
their legal status, when controlling for the type of migrant the results regarding
the network size do not change (comparing columns 2 with 4, and 6 with
16The sample size reduces because not all migrants reported their intentions to return or
not to the US to look for a job.
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8). Moreover, the sample is also divided by type of migrant, returnee or
circular. The results are in the Appendix in Table 1.10, these show that there
is no difference on the effect of the network size on remittances according
to migrants’ intentions to return to United States. Remittances from both
types of migrants respond in the same way and magnitude to the size of the
network. Thus, although circular migrants are more likely to be legal and
returnees illegals, estimations from Table 1.8 are indeed capturing the legal
status of migrants, it might be the case that illegal migrants are worried about
the duration of their stay abroad and they tend to send more remittances
compared to legal migrants in the same network size.
1.3.1 Robustness Checks
One important factor to consider is the closeness to the border, according to
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 there is a higher concentration of Mexican migrants in
counties nearer the southern border of the United States. Thus, it might be
the case that the omitted variable distance can be leading the results. In order
to check this, the distance to the border is included in the model. In particular,
the distance of each county’s centroid to the nearest point of the border with
Mexico is used.17 The same models as before are estimated but including the
distance to the border as an additional control, the results are shown in Table
1.9.
The distance to the border is statistically different from zero for the OLS
estimations, however it looses significance for the IV estimations and the co-
efficient is lower. Furthermore, according to Hausman test the OLS estimates
are biased and inconsistent, the null of endogenous regressors is rejected at a
95% confidence interval. The effect of the network size is reduced by around
17The measure of distance is computed in decimal degrees.
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Table 1.9: Estimations for the effect of Networks on Remittances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Network Size -0.091∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
[-0.063] [-0.078] [-0.069] [-0.086] [-0.068] [-0.083]
(0.0302) (0.0338) (0.0317) (0.0359) (0.0318) (0.0359)
Distance 0.041∗ 0.029 0.051∗∗ 0.038 0.050∗∗ 0.039
[0.071] [0.051] [0.088] [0.067] [0.087] [0.069]
(0.0238) (0.0271) (0.0240) (0.0279) (0.0225) (0.0263)
Age 21-30 0.242∗∗ 0.241∗∗ 0.262∗∗ 0.262∗∗ 0.248∗∗ 0.247∗∗
[0.037] [0.037] [0.041] [0.040] [0.038] [0.038]
(0.0998) (0.0991) (0.1031) (0.1023) (0.0998) (0.0987)
Age 31-40 0.188 0.187 0.240∗ 0.239∗ 0.220∗ 0.219∗
[0.029] [0.029] [0.038] [0.037] [0.034] [0.034]
(0.1354) (0.1346) (0.1358) (0.1349) (0.1289) (0.1274)
Age 41-50 -0.129 -0.130 -0.064 -0.064 -0.065 -0.066
[-0.018] [-0.018] [-0.009] [-0.009] [-0.009] [-0.009]
(0.1617) (0.1611) (0.1546) (0.1540) (0.1491) (0.1478)
Age 51-60 -0.227∗ -0.224∗ -0.193∗ -0.189∗ -0.202∗ -0.199∗
[-0.021] [-0.021] [-0.018] [-0.018] [-0.019] [-0.019]
(0.1183) (0.1180) (0.1130) (0.1130) (0.1100) (0.1094)
Age 61-70 -0.349∗∗ -0.344∗∗ -0.403∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗ -0.400∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗
[-0.018] [-0.018] [-0.020] [-0.020] [-0.020] [-0.020]
(0.1494) (0.1491) (0.1448) (0.1447) (0.1437) (0.1430)
Male 0.794∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗
[0.085] [0.084] [0.072] [0.071] [0.071] [0.070]
(0.0731) (0.0731) (0.0694) (0.0693) (0.0696) (0.0693)
Married 0.099∗ 0.099∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
[0.014] [0.014] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
(0.0551) (0.0548) (0.0530) (0.0526) (0.0527) (0.0522)
HH Head 0.035 0.035 -0.022 -0.022 -0.013 -0.014
[0.005] [0.005] [-0.003] [-0.003] [-0.002] [-0.002]
(0.0556) (0.0554) (0.0541) (0.0538) (0.0522) (0.0516)
Go back alone 0.650∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗
[0.107] [0.107] [0.106] [0.106]
(0.0768) (0.0766) (0.0786) (0.0780)
N HH workers -0.016 -0.016 -0.013 -0.013
[-0.007] [-0.007] [-0.006] [-0.006]
(0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0219) (0.0218)
Yrs last trip -0.044∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
[-0.054] [-0.055] [-0.058] [-0.058]
(0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0088) (0.0088)
N 26544 26544 26544 26544 26544 26544
R2 0.052 0.052 0.065 0.065 0.090 0.090
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*State FE No No No No Yes Yes
F 137.8 137.9 139.1
Source: EMIF 1999-2009. Notes: The sample is composed of migrants between 16-70 years old who worked
in the last 30 days of their stay in US. The dependent variable, remittances, records the amount of money
sent back home in a month and is measured in logs. Network size is a ratio of two ratios, the proportion
of Mexicans in a given county over the proportion of Mexicans in US. The omitted age group is migrants
between 16-20 years old. The control variables are as described in Table 1.1. Standardized coefficients are
in brackets. Year fixed effects contain dummies for the years contemplated on the EMIF. State fixed effects
only contain dummies for the states with counties where migrants reported to live. For the Year*State fixed
effects, each year is multiplied by each state. IV regressions are instrumented with the Mexican network size
at county level in 1960. The instrument is constructed in the same fashion as the variable of interest, using
data from the US Census. First-stage F-statistics are reported at the end of the table. Standard errors are
clustered at county level for all regressions and in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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0.012 standard deviations compared to results from Table 1.3, nonetheless
remains negative and significant. Thus, from the results of Table 1.9 we can
conclude that remittances are not driven by the county closeness to the border
but rather by the size of the network.
Additionally to instrumenting with past migration rates from the sixties, I
followed the strategy used by Aparicio (2014). I instrumented the network size
at county level in 2000, with a higher aggregation level, namely the network
size at state level for 2000. The estimations yield to similar results, and are
presented in Table 1.11. The change of an increase of one standard deviation in
the network size at state level leads to a decrease of 0.133 and 0.142 standard
deviations on the amount remitted, for the estimations with different sets of
control variables.
I also analyse the network size at a different disaggregation level, the state.
The measure is constructed in the same fashion as the county level, but in-
stead of measuring the proportion of Mexicans living in each county I use the
proportion of Mexicans living in each state of US. To instrument for this new
measure, I also compute the state network size with data from 1960. The re-
sults for the two different sets of covariates are presented in Table 1.12. State
network size also present a negative effect on the level of remittances, however
this effect is higher. One standard deviation increase in the network size leads
to a decrease of 0.155 standard deviations for column (2) and a decrease of
0.152 standard deviations for column (4) on remittances. Thus, the US state
where a migrant moves to has a higher impact on his remittance behaviour.
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1.4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I analysed the effect of network size on remittances and the
likelihood to remit. First, I developed a theoretical framework to explain
the influence of network size on remittances. Second, I used a pooled cross
sectional data from a Mexican Survey to construct a measure of networks
size; which is the proportion of co-ethnics living in the same county as the
migrant, relative to the national average population of co-ethnics. To account
for the endogeneity of network size I used past migration as an instrumental
variable. I found a negative effect regarding the size of network and the amount
remitted. Moreover, the bigger the network size, the bigger the negative effect
on remittances. This effect is robust when controlling for the endogeneity
of the network and also when controlling for the distance to the border. The
network negative effect is greater when the network size is constructed at state
level. Another result is that legal migrants are more affected by the network
size and remit less than illegal.
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1.5 Appendix
Figure 1.2: Number of Mexicans by Counties
Source: EMIF 1999-2009, own elaboration.
42
Table 1.10: Estimations for the effect of Networks on Remittances by Type of
Migrant
Returnee Circular
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
Network Size -0.081 -0.125∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.0508) (0.0459) (0.0273) (0.0287)
Age 21-30 -0.047 -0.043 0.290∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(0.1773) (0.1752) (0.1109) (0.1102)
Age 31-40 0.198 0.200 0.211 0.211
(0.1837) (0.1808) (0.1462) (0.1453)
Age 41-50 -0.212 -0.202 -0.088 -0.089
(0.2368) (0.2333) (0.1642) (0.1637)
Age 51-60 -0.744∗∗ -0.724∗∗ -0.160 -0.157
(0.3212) (0.3178) (0.1233) (0.1231)
Age 61-70 -1.225∗∗ -1.234∗∗ -0.267∗ -0.262∗
(0.5026) (0.4973) (0.1594) (0.1591)
Male 0.641∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗
(0.1960) (0.1943) (0.0716) (0.0714)
Married 0.678∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.020
(0.1141) (0.1128) (0.0612) (0.0608)
HH Head -0.259∗∗ -0.255∗∗ 0.078 0.079
(0.1222) (0.1212) (0.0506) (0.0503)
N 3071 3071 22898 22898
R2 0.054 0.054 0.057 0.057
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 257.581 174.007
Source: EMIF 1999-2009. Notes: The sample is composed of migrants between 16-70 years old who worked in
the last 30 days of their stay in US. Migrants are considered returnees if they reported to not have intentions
to return to the US, while if they reported they have intentions to return to the US are considered circular
migrants. The dependent variable, remittances, records the amount of money sent back home in a month and
is measured in logs. Network size is a ratio of two ratios, the proportion of Mexicans in a given county over
the proportion of Mexicans in US. The omitted age group is migrants between 16-20 years old. The control
variables are as described in Table 1.1. Year fixed effects contain dummies for the years contemplated on the
EMIF. State fixed effects only contain dummies for the states with counties where migrants reported to live.
For the Year*State fixed effects, each year is multiplied by each state. Standard errors are clustered at county
level for all regressions. IV regressions are instrumented with the Mexican network size at county level in 1960.
The instrument is constructed in the same fashion as the variable of interest, using data from the US Census.
First-stage F-statistics are reported at the end of the table. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.11: Estimations for the effect of Networks on Remittances
Instrumenting with State level data
(1) (2)
IV IV
Network Size -0.193∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗
[-0.133] [-0.142]
(0.0440) (0.0429)
Age 21-30 0.298∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗
(0.0914) (0.0973)
Age 31-40 0.252∗∗ 0.306∗∗
(0.1204) (0.1231)
Age 41-50 -0.051 0.019
(0.1392) (0.1345)
Age 51-60 -0.120 -0.086
(0.1146) (0.1137)
Age 61-70 -0.214 -0.283∗∗
(0.1407) (0.1410)
Male 0.758∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗
(0.0713) (0.0773)
Married 0.046 0.139∗∗
(0.0654) (0.0560)
Household head 0.079 0.006
(0.0724) (0.0556)
Cross back Alone 0.716∗∗∗
(0.0816)
N Household workers -0.020
(0.0243)
Yrs last trip -0.044∗∗∗
(0.0130)
N 26547 26547
R2 0.026 0.041
Year FE Yes Yes
F 64.246 65.897
Source: EMIF 1999-2009. Notes: The sample is composed of migrants between 16-70 years old who worked in
the last 30 days of their stay in US. The dependent variable, remittances, records the amount of money sent
back home in a month and is measured in logs. Network size is a ratio of two ratios, the proportion of Mexicans
in a given county over the proportion of Mexicans in US. The omitted age group is migrants between 16-20
years old. The control variables are as described in Table 1.1. Year fixed effects contain dummies for the years
contemplated on the EMIF. Standard errors are clustered at county level for all regressions. IV regressions are
instrumented with the Mexican network size at state level in 2000. The instrument is constructed in the same
fashion as the variable of interest but at the state level, using data from the US Census. First-stage F-statistics
are reported at the end of the table. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.12: Estimations for the effect of Networks at State Level on Remit-
tances
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
State Network Size -0.227∗∗∗ -0.474∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗ -0.467∗∗
[-0.074] [-0.155] [-0.078] [-0.152]
(0.0594) (0.2358) (0.0575) (0.2096)
Age 21-30 0.295∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.0934) (0.1080) (0.1000) (0.1120)
Age 31-40 0.242∗ 0.252∗ 0.290∗ 0.303∗∗
(0.1432) (0.1434) (0.1515) (0.1492)
Age 41-50 -0.062 -0.022 0.002 0.039
(0.1437) (0.1266) (0.1325) (0.1173)
Age 51-60 -0.172∗ -0.110 -0.145 -0.089
(0.0996) (0.0963) (0.0946) (0.0923)
Age 61-70 -0.285∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗ -0.357∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗
(0.0935) (0.0933) (0.0929) (0.0903)
Male 0.880∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.754∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗
(0.0969) (0.1082) (0.1147) (0.1267)
Married 0.057 0.055 0.150∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.0627) (0.0605) (0.0436) (0.0460)
HH head 0.073 0.085 0.009 0.025
(0.0968) (0.1062) (0.0734) (0.0839)
Go back alone 0.686∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗
(0.1050) (0.0939)
N HH workers -0.013 -0.010
(0.0271) (0.0249)
Yrs last trip -0.038∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0140)
N 26547 26547 26547 26547
R2 0.030 0.023 0.043 0.038
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 12.211 12.932
Source: EMIF 1999-2009. Notes: The sample is composed of migrants between 16-70 years old who worked
in the last 30 days of their stay in US. The dependent variable, remittances, records the amount of money
sent back home in a month and is measured in logs. Network size is a ratio of two ratios, the proportion of
Mexicans in a given state over the proportion of Mexicans in US. The omitted age group is migrants between
16-20 years old. The control variables are as described in Table 1.1. Year fixed effects contain dummies for the
years contemplated on the EMIF. Standard errors are clustered at state level for all regressions. IV regressions
are instrumented with the Mexican network size at state level in 1960. The instrument is constructed in the
same fashion as the variable of interest, using data from the US Census. First-stage F-statistics are reported at
the end of the table. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 2
The effect of migrants’ exposure
to entrepreneurship at the host
and home countries on
remitting for business purposes
Miriam Saldan˜a Herna´ndez
Abstract
I investigate how exposure to entrepreneurship at both the host and home
countries affect migrants’ decisions to remit for business purposes. Using data
of Mexican migrants retuning from the United States, I combine individual
data on migrants, which contains information on the origin and destination,
and aggregate self-employment rates at the county and municipality level for
the US and Mexico, in this way, I can control for selection of migrants by ac-
counting for state by-origin-and-destination fixed effects. After controlling for
selection the results suggest that only the exposure to entrepreneurship at the
home country (Mexico) has a significant and negative effect on the decision
to remit for business purposes. Broader exposure to entrepreneurship in the
host country is analysed using the rates of entrepreneurship of Latinos and
non-Mexicans.
JEL classification: F22, F24, J15, L26, R23
Key words: Remittances, entrepreneurship, Mexican migrants, entrepreneurial
exposure
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Introduction
There is a large literature on the determinants of migrant entrepreneurship, in-
cluding characteristics at the origin or destination (Fairlie and Lofstrom, 2014;
Naude´ et al., 2015). However, little is known on how home and host country
characteristics might jointly determine the decision to engage in entrepreneur-
ship. Recent literature suggests that the entrepreneurial environment where
a person resides serves as a learning opportunity and affect his occupational
choices (Andersson and Larsson, 2014; Giannetti and Simonov, 2004; Guiso
et al., 2015). In this paper, I empirically investigate the effect that exposure
to entrepreneurship in both the location at host and home country have on
migrants’ intentions to become entrepreneurs.
Due to its characteristics, Mexico provides a good case study of migrants’
exposure to entrepreneurship at the host and home countries. For the last
25 years, Mexico ranked among the top five countries with self-employment
rate ranging between 32% and 45% (OECD, 2017). According to Fairlie and
Woodruff (2007), Mexican immigrants in the United States have a significant
lower rate of self-employment or entrepreneurship compared to natives and
other immigrant groups. Furthermore, according to 2015 estimates by the
United Nations, 98% of Mexicans living outside Mexico reside in the United
States. Mexican migrants represent almost 26% of the migrant population in
the United States.1
This paper contributes to the literature by analysing the effect of en-
trepreneurial exposure in both the origin and destination localities on mi-
grants’ intentions to involve in entrepreneurial activities. The data for this
study comes from the Survey of Migration in the Northern Border of Mexico
1Department of Economic and Social Affairs. http://www.un.org/en/development/
desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml
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(hereafter EMIF, for its acronym in Spanish). Unlike other Mexican surveys
about migration, the EMIF provides more detailed information on the host
and home localities. The National Survey of Demographic Dynamics (ENA-
DID) and the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) both provide the migrant’s
locality of origin. However, for the place of destination, the ENADID only
reports states and the MMP records the Metropolitan Statistical Areas. 2
Moreover, the EMIF collects information on migrants who are either re-
turning temporarily or permanently to Mexico from the United States.3 The
survey includes socio-demographic and work related characteristics of migrants
both before (in Mexico) and after migration (in the United States), and infor-
mation on the motives to remit including remitting for business purposes. The
motivation to remit for business purposes is used as proxy for migrants’ in-
tentions to engage in entrepreneurial activities. In specific migrants are asked
if the money they sent was used to buy, establish, or expand a business (in
Mexico). Due to data availability, the entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico is
measured as the rate of self-employment, whereas the entrepreneurial exposure
in United States consist of the ratio of Mexican business entrepreneurs. Thus,
I use entrepreneur to refer to either a self-employed individual or business
owner.
After controlling for selection the results suggest that the home country
entrepreneurial exposure has a negative effect on migrants’ probability to remit
for business purposes whereas the entrepreneurial exposure in the host country
2Another reason why I use the EMIF is because for the ENADID the migrant’s occupa-
tional choice refers to the job held in the last week, previous to the survey, therefore is not
clear whether it was held in the United States or Mexico. Regarding the MMP, this database
specifies if the migrant was owner of a small business or factory, as well as merchant in a
retail establishment. Nonetheless, it comprises only a small portion of communities, by 2017
just 161 communities where sampled.
3Due to geographical proximity, Mexican migration to the United States is characterized
to a great extent by circular migrants who travel back and forth for different reasons (e.g.
visiting family, seasonal work, deported).
53
has no effect. Without controlling for state by-origin-and-destination fixed
effects the estimates of the entrepreneurial exposure in both countries are
biased. In particular, the entrepreneurial exposure of Mexicans in the United
States is upward biased, whereas the entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico is
downward biased.
I also explore whether a broader exposure to entrepreneurship in the host
country has an impact on migrants’ intentions to get involved in entrepreneurial
activities. For this purpose, I use the ratios of Latino and non-Mexican busi-
ness owners in the United States. The results suggest that Latinos behave
similarly to the entrepreneurial exposure of Mexicans abroad. The estimates
were biased before controlling for selection, showing a positive and significant
effect. However, the coefficient losses significance after controlling for selec-
tion. With regard to the entrepreneurial exposure of non-Mexicans, I find no
effect on migrants’ intentions to become entrepreneurs.
Research on how the occupational choices of migrants are affected has fo-
cused on the host and home country separately. Nevertheless, I find that
controlling for the interaction of states at home and host country is impor-
tant, thus, the results from these studies may be misleading. In contrast with
these studies, this paper analyses the entrepreneurial environment a migrant
is exposed before and after migration. Studies in the home country mainly
focus on the determinants of returnees’ entrepreneurship. Like Piracha and
Vadean (2010) and Wahba and Zenou (2012), who analyse if returnee migrants
are more likely to become entrepreneurs than non-migrants. Similarly, Dust-
mann and Kirchkamp (2002) show that returnees are more likely to engage
in entrepreneurial activities after they return. Another factor promoting self-
employment among returnees is the experience obtained from abroad (Black
and Castaldo, 2009; Kilic et al., 2009). In the case of the host country, many
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studies focus on the effects of the so called ethnic enclaves. It is widely known
that migrants have the tendency to cluster in neighbourhoods or areas with
a high proportion of co-ethnics (Logan et al., 2002; Massey, 1985). Some
studies find mixed evidence about how living among more co-ethnics affect
migrants’ occupational choices (Clark and Drinkwater, 2000, 2002; Fairchild,
2010; Fairlie and Woodruff, 2007; Razin and Langlois, 1996).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The following section
describes the hypotheses to test. Section 2.2 details the different datasets used
and how the variables of interest where constructed. Section 2.3 specifies the
estimation model as well as the results. The last section concludes.
2.1 Theoretical Framework
The mechanisms through which entrepreneurial exposure can influence mi-
grants’ intentions to get involved in entrepreneurial activities are described
below. It is important to keep in mind a couple of things. First, this paper
uses data from Mexican migrants returning either temporarily or permanently
to Mexico from the United States. Second, I use migrants’ motivations to
remit for business purposes as a proxy for their intentions to engage in en-
trepreneurial activities. Therefore, such entrepreneurial activities are expected
to take place at the home country (in Mexico) rather than at the host country
(in the United States). Moreover, migration, remittances, and entrepreneur-
ship might be choices taken at the household level, however, since most of the
migrants in our sample are household heads they are likely to represent the
interests and choices of the household.
Entrepreneurial neighborhoods defined as wards or localities with high
density of entrepreneurs, are found to have a positive impact on individuals
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choossing entrepreneurship as occupational choice. Using data from Sweden,
Andersson and Larsson (2014), Giannetti and Simonov (2009), and Lindquist
et al. (2015) find that residing in entrepreneurial neighbourhoods increases
the likelihood that an individual becomes an entrepreneur. Moreover, Guiso
et al. (2015) argue that the environment where a person grows up is more
likely to shape her, such as being surrounded by more entrepreneurs. Using
data from Italy, they find that the entrepreneurial density of the place where
an individual grew up has a positive impact on the likelihood of becoming an
entrepreneur.
The fact that a highly entrepreneurial locality is more likely to produce
an entreprenuer is explained by Andersson and Larsson (2014) by three types
of local social interactions. The first one is motivation and self-confidence,
observing a large quantity of entrepreneurs in one’s locality may encourage one
to engage in entrepreneurial activities. The second type of social interaction
is the status an entrepreneur has in the society, if they are considered as
having a high social status then it may stimulate entrepreneurship among
ambitious individuals. A further social interaction, is the spillover information
and knowledge you can obtain from entrepreneurs. An individual is more likely
to acquire and/or learn entrepreneurial skills when is surrounded by a large
share of entrepreneurs. For these reasons, I expect that migrants who were
exposed to a highly entrepreneurial environment are more likely to engage in
entrepreneurial activities. This hypothesis applies to both the entrepreneurial
exposure at the host and the home country, since the mechanisms mentioned
before can equally apply to the places of origin and destination.
One aspect that also should be considered is that a relatively large ratio
of entrepreneurs in one’s locality can also play a detrimental effect against
becoming an entrepreneur. Specifically, if the market is overcrowded with
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entrepreneurs it will be harder for the migrant to start up his own business
due to higher competition, as suggested by Aldrich and Waldinger (1990). In
their paper they refer to competition in enclaves in the host country. In the
same way, this competition can also take place at the home country. For the
entrepreneurial exposure at home, more competition will decrease migrants’
probability to remit for business purposes since migrants might find more
attractive to engage in entrepreneurial activities at the host country. As for the
case of entrepreneurial exposure at the host country this will lead to an increase
in the probability to remit for business purposes, since more competition in
the host country might encourage migrants to start a business at home which
will mean remitting more for business purposes.
Therefore, although evidence suggests that exposure to entrepreneurship
has a positive effect on the probability of becoming entrepreneur this might
not be the case for the entrepreneurial exposure in the home country if the
market is overcrowded.
2.2 Data
To test the hypotheses stated above, I use three datasets. I first describe the
survey used to account for the exposure to entrepreneurship in Mexico. Next, I
present the database for entrepreneurial exposure in the United States. Then,
I detail the main dataset which provides socio-demographic and labour market
characteristics on migrants returning temporarily or permanently to Mexico
from the United States, the EMIF. Last, I describe how the main variables are
constructed, along with the data description.
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2.2.1 The ENOE
The National Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE, for its acronym
in Spanish) is collected by the Mexico’s National Information and Census Of-
fice. The ENOE contains quarterly individual data since 2005 to date and
provides detailed information of the Mexican occupational as well as demo-
graphic and economic characteristics.4 The ENOE is the result of a consolida-
tion and merge of two previous national surveys which provided information
on the labour force and unemployment for more than 20 years. The National
Survey of Urban Employment and the National Survey of Employment, where
the later includes the former.
The main advantage of this data, for this research, is that it provides de-
tailed individual data about the Mexican labour force and its characteristics.
This individual level data can be aggregated at higher levels, such as munici-
palities or states. Although the survey main purpose is to generate quarterly
indicators of general labour market outcomes at national level, the ENOE is
representative for localities with less than 2,500 inhabitants.
For the purposes of this research, I use information about the labour force
and occupational choices for the period 2005-2012. In particular, for house-
hold members above 14 years old they are categorized by labour force status,
whether they are employed or unemployed. Furthermore, the employed indi-
viduals also report the position on their job: subordinate and paid workers,
employers, self-employed, unpaid workers, and not specified. From these, I
focus on those who report themselves as self-employed.
4The ENOE is formed by five questionnaires: housing, household, socio-demographic,
occupation and employment I, and II.
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2.2.2 The SBO
The Survey of Business Owners (SBO) contains economic and demographic
characteristics for businesses and business owners in the United States.5 It is
conducted on a firm or company basis, where a firm consist of one or more
domestic establishments. The survey covers all businesses filing Internal Rev-
enue Service tax forms as individual proprietorship, partnerships, or any type
of corporation with revenues of more than $1,000 USD. In particular, the SBO
covers all sectors classified in the North American Industry Classification Sys-
tem (NAICS).6
The SBO contains data on business ownership by ethnicity and race and
data can be aggregated at the county level. Data of business ownership at
the county level is essential since migrants in the EMIF reported the counties
they resided in the United States. Although the survey was integrated to
the economic census in 1972 and has been conducted every five years, data
on ethnicity before 2002 reported only if the owner had Hispanic or Latino
origin. From 2007 the ethnicity group Hispanic or Latino is more detailed
and records information on the place of origin. Therefore, the SBO waves of
2007 and 2012 provide in detail the place of origin, and identify the number
of Mexican business owners.7 For the purposes of this research, an individual
is categorized from Mexico if he or she was reported to be Mexican American,
Chicano, or from Mexico.
5By definition, business ownership is defined as having 51% or more of the stock or equity
in the business.
6Except those classified as: Crop and animal production; Rail transportation; Postal
service; Monetary Authorities-Central Bank; Funds, Trusts, and other Financial Vehicles;
Religious, Grantmaking, Civic, Professional, and Similar organization; Private households;
Public administration.
7Using data from 2007 or 2012 yields similar results.
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2.2.3 The EMIF
The Survey of Migration in the Northern Border of Mexico, EMIF, is an
annual sample survey from 1999 to date that collects individual information of
Mexican migrants going back to Mexico from the United States. The survey
includes returnees and circular migrants, since a large share of individuals
reported that have intentions to migrate again to the United States. The EMIF
includes information on Mexicans above the age of 12 and entering Northern
Mexico by land. Before the survey takes place some screening questions are
performed to avoid US citizens or commuters from Northern Mexico, since
commuting to work is very common along the border. The survey is carried
out at arrival gates in bus stations or at customs inspection points located
in specific Mexican cities along the Mexico-United States border. On these
specific points, individuals pass only once per visit to the city which facilitates
the sampling and avoids double counting.
The EMIF main objective is to collect detailed information on the socio-
demographic and labour characteristics of migrants before (in Mexico) and
after migration (in the United States). It also gathers information on migra-
tion, such as when and how migrants crossed the border, if they received help,
the time spent abroad, their legal status, remittances, among others. Such
information helps to analyse the migratory phenomenon between these two
countries. An essential characteristic for this research offered by the dataset is
that it collects information on two key locations, the place where migrants used
to live in Mexico before migrating and the place they used to live while they
were in the United States. Specifically, it reports municipalities for Mexico
and counties for the United States.
I use the surveys taken in the period 1999-2012, which contains 92,176
individual-level observations. For the aim of this study, I am interested on
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migrant entrepreneurs. Although there is no direct question regarding a mi-
grant being a business owner or self-employed, the survey provides information
on whether the migrant remitted for business purposes, which can be used as
a proxy for entrepreneurship. Migrants remitting for business purposes are
more likely to intend to get involved in entrepreneurial activities. The EMIF
provides information on whether migrants worked and remitted when living in
the United States, as well as the purposes of remitting. If a migrant ever send
money back home, he is asked about his motives for sending money. Therefore,
I focus on migrants who sent remittances for business purposes versus those
who sent remittances for any other motive.
2.2.4 Variables construction
2.2.4.1 Remitting for business purposes
The dependent variable is dichotomous and represents whether the migrant
remitted for business purposes or for any other motive. All the migrants
who reported their motivations to remit are considered in the final sample,
independently of the amount remitted (i.e. zero or positive remittances).8 For
the period of 1999-2009, the questions on the motives to remit are only asked
to migrants who worked in the United States during their last trip. Where
their last trip refers to the time they spent in the United States right before
the survey took place. Meanwhile in the period 2010-2012, migrants are asked
if they remitted during the last 12 months of their stay whether they worked
or not. In order to keep consistency across these two periods and since I can
identify those who worked during 2010-2012. For the period 2010-2012 I only
include in the estimated sample those who worked while living in the United
States. As a result, the final sample only includes migrants who worked in
8Unless migrants missed to report any of the variables of interest or control.
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the United States and reported their motives to remit, independently of the
amount remitted.
Since 1999, the EMIF collects information on the main motive to remit,
but from 2005 onwards besides the main motive it also records additional
motives to remit.9 To sum up, the dependent variable takes the value of 1
if migrants reported to remit to buy, establish or expand a business (i.e. as
main or additional reason) and takes the value of 0 if migrants reported any
other motive to remit than for business. See Table 2.7 in the Appendix for the
descriptives of main and additional reasons to remit.
2.2.4.2 Exposure to entrepreneurship
The exposure to entrepreneurship in this research is measured as the density
of entrepreneurs in both migrants’ place of origin and destination. Both mea-
sures of entrepreneurial exposure are measured at the locality level, that is,
municipalities in Mexico and counties in the United States. Both variables
try to capture the degree of the entrepreneurial environment to which the mi-
grant is exposed before and after migration. Let’s recall that in this study,
I use entrepreneur to refer to either a self-employed individual or business
owner. For the exposure to entrepreneurship in Mexico the ENOE provides
self-employment data whereas the SBO contains information on the business
owners in the United States.
The exposure to entrepreneurship at home is measured as the proportion of
self-employed in the municipality a migrant reported to live before migration.
That is, a ratio of the number of self-employed individuals relative to the
population in the labour force per municipality, as reported in Table 2.1. This
9The motives to remit are the following: 1) to buy land or agricultural implements, 2)
to buy, establish or expand a business, 3) to improve or buy a house, 4) to buy a car or
home appliances, 5) to pay debts, 6) to buy food and/or pay rent, and 7) something else.
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ratio aims to capture the degree of entrepreneurial skills and information that
migrants from a municipality are exposed to before their migration to the
United States. The ratio EMX is calculated at the municipality level, using
the average across years (2005-2012 from the ENOE) of individuals in self-
employment and population in the labour force. Therefore, the ratio does not
vary across years. This is due to the design of the ENOE.
For my purpose, this dataset has two limitations. First, data for some
municipalities across years is not available. Second, not all the municipalities
are included in the sample period 2005-2012. Thus, labour characteristics are
missing for some municipalities. Since the changes in self-employment rates
are not drastic over time, using the EMX as time invariant does not represent
a problem. Besides, using the average across years also addresses the problem
posed by those municipalities where data is not available for all the years of
the survey. This is because the EMX uses the average of the years that each
municipality is surveyed. Regarding the second issue of missing municipalities,
although it reduces the observations used on regressions because there is no
data for self-employment in some municipalities migrants reported to live, for
the analysis of this paper I only use data of sampled municipalities to obtain
sharper results.10
For the exposure to entrepreneurship in the United States, EUS, I want
to capture the influence that Mexican entrepreneurs can have among Mexican
migrants. Therefore, I use the proportion of Mexican entrepreneurs relative
to the total population of Mexicans living in a county, as shown in Table
2.1. The information on the population of Mexicans per county is obtained
10One way to include the missing municipalities on the model is calculating the average of
the EMX of each state using the available sampled municipalities and assign this average to
the missing municipalities within that state. The estimations including missing municipali-
ties yield similar results. Also instead of using the mean to replace missing municipalities,
using either the state’s mode or minimum value show similar results.
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Table 2.1: Measures of Entrepreneurial Exposure
Variable Formula
Entrepreneurial Exposure
EMX =
No. Self-employed in m
Population in the labour force in min Mexico
Entrepreneurial Exposure
EUS =
Mexican business owners in c
Mexican population in cin US
Exposure to Non-Mexicans
EUSNMX =
Non-Mexican business owners in c
Non-Mexican population in cEntrepreneurship in US
Exposure to Latinos
EUSL =
Latino business owners in c
Latino population in cEntrepreneurship in US
Note: m is Mexican municipality and c is US county.
through the 2010 US Census. Using the 2007 or 2012 waves from the SBO
gives very similar results, for the estimations of this paper I use the wave of
2012. With this data, I compute a ratio where the numerator is the number
of Mexican business owners in a county, and the denominator is the total
Mexican population of that county. I argue that EUS is a good proxy for the
exposure to entrepreneurial environment from other co-ethnics that Mexican
migrants experienced while living and working in the United States.
Evidence suggests that migrants tend to cluster in specific areas of the host
country and to interact more with people of similar cultures (Strielkowski,
2011). In addition to the entrepreneurial exposure of Mexicans in the United
States, I compute a ratio of Latino business owners to test whether a broader
exposure to entrepreneurship has a similar impact on the intentions to get
involved in entrepreneurial activities. Similarly, non-Mexican entrepreneurs
could encourage entrepreneurship among migrants. Kanas et al. (2009) find
that immigrants who have more contact with natives are more likely to be self-
employed. Consequently, I use the ratio of non-Mexicans to exploit the possi-
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bility that Mexican migrants might learn not only from Mexican entrepreneurs
but also from other entrepreneurs around them. These ratios are computed
in the same fashion, and are shown in Table 2.1. They consist in the num-
ber of business owners by race and county relative to the total population of
non-Mexicans and Latinos, respectively.
2.2.5 The characteristics of migrants
During the period of 1999-2012 the EMIF collected information on 92,350 indi-
viduals. As mentioned before, information about the purposes of remittances
is conditional on having worked and remitted during the migrant’s last stay
in the United States for the period 1999-2009, and having remitted during the
last 12 months of their stay from 2010 to 2012. From the total sample, around
55% stated they have worked in the United States and around 30% send money
back home. Almost all who remitted also reported the motives to do it, 25%
out of the total sample. From the almost 23,300 migrants who reported the
motives to remit, close to 4,500 did not report the county where they were
living in the United States. Nevertheless, the vast majority reported the U.S.
state. Although almost all migrants reported the municipality of origin, as
mentioned before the data on self-employment is not available for all munic-
ipalities. Therefore, more observations are dropped from the dataset, almost
3,200 of them. A few observations of the missing data for the counties and
municipalities overlap. Thus the final sample consist of 15,680 individuals who
worked, remitted, and reported the motives to remit as well as the localities
in Mexico and United States.
Table 2.2 contains the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
estimations, for the total sample of 15,680 migrants. To begin with, the pro-
portion of remitters for business purposes is small, only 5% of the sample send
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Remitted for business 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico 0.22 0.09 0.06 0.76
Entrepreneurial exposure in US 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.18
Age 36.49 10.59 16.00 70.00
Male 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00
Married 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00
High school 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Illegal 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Years since migration (YSM) 11.22 10.49 0.00 64.00
Number of family earners (NFE) 1.93 1.29 0.00 20.00
N 15680
Source: EMIF 1999-2012, own elaboration.
Notes: The sample is composed of migrants between 16-70 years old. The depen-
dent variable, takes value of 1 if the migrant ever sent money for business purposes
and 0 if the migrant sent money for any other reason. The entrepreneurial expo-
sure in Mexico is measured as the ratio of self-employed people over the labour
force population in a given municipality. The entrepreneurial exposure in United
States is calculated as the ratio of Mexican business owners over the total Mexican
population in a county. Age, YSM, and NFE, are continuous variables, whereas
Male, Married, High School and Illegal are dichotomous. Married takes value of 1
if the migrant is or has been married before and 0 if he is single. High school takes
value of 1 if the migrant has more than 7 years of education, and 0 otherwise.
Illegal takes value of 1 if the migrant crossed the border without a legal document
and 0 if he crossed the border with a valid document.
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money to buy, establish or expand a business. Regarding the main variables
of interest, the exposure to entrepreneurship in Mexico varies between 6 and
76% with a mean of 22%. On the other hand, the exposure to entrepreneur-
ship in the United States ranges from 0 to 18% and the mean is 5%. This is
consistent with the literature and past empirical evidence, that the rate of self-
employment among Mexican immigrants in the United States is low compared
to the rate of self-employment in Mexico (Fairlie and Woodruff, 2007).
The rest of the Table 2.2 shows the control variables used on the model.
The sample is delimited to migrants in working age between 16 and 70 years
old. High school is a dummy that captures migrants’ education and takes the
value of 1 for migrants with seven or more years of education, 0 otherwise.
Illegal is a binary variable that takes value of 1 if the migrant crossed the
border without a legal document or visa, 0 otherwise. Years since migration,
represents the number of years since the migrant crossed for the first time to
the United States to look for a job. The last variable accounts for the number
of family members that contribute to migrant’s household expenses.
Table 2.3 shows the same descriptive variables for the two groups of mi-
grants. On the left hand side are those migrants who remitted to buy, establish
or expand a business, whereas on the right hand side are the migrants who
stated any other purpose to send money. A t-test is presented in the last
columns showing that the group means are statistically different from zero.
The exposure to entrepreneurship in both countries have around the same
proportion of entrepreneurs for both groups. For the entrepreneurial exposure
in Mexico, those who remitted for business the minimum and maximum value
range between 11 and 59% while for migrants who remitted for other motives
the proportion of self-employment oscillates from 6 to 76%. Whereas the val-
ues for the exposure to entrepreneurship in the United States are very similar
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for both groups.
2.3 Estimation
To test the hypotheses of entrepreneurial exposure determining migrants’ in-
tentions to become entrepreneurs, the following equation is modelled:
R Businessit =β0 + β1EMXi + β2EUSi + β3Xit + β4φMX + β5φUS
+ β6φMX ∗ φUS + β7φt + εit
(2.1)
where R Businessit takes value of 1 if migrant i sent remittances for business
purposes in period t, and takes the value of 0 if the migrant remitted for any
other motive. The entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico is given by EMXi and
the entrepreneurial exposure of Mexican entrepreneurs in the United States
is represented by EUSi. The migrants’ individual characteristics are included
in vector Xit, containing the migrant’s age, gender, marital status, level of
education, legal status, years since migration and the number of family earners.
While vectors φMX , φUS and φMX ∗ φUS correspond to sets of state dummies
for Mexico, United States, and their interaction, that account for fixed state
differences determining the outcome. Similarly, φt represent year dummies to
absorb shocks in any given year of the sample. Lastly, the error term is given
by εit.
As mentioned before, residing in highly entrepreneurial localities might
have a positive influence on entrepreneurship. Individuals rely on information
and reassurance from others, and also learn from other entrepreneurs how to
develop and manage businesses. Both the entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico
and United States are included to account for the opportunity to learn and
acquire managerial skills, and how these affect migrants’ decisions to remit for
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business purposes.
2.3.1 Results
Table 2.4 shows the main results of this research estimating equation (2.1)
using a probit model, average marginal effects are reported. In all regressions
a set of year dummies is included, although is not reported in the table. The
estimation of column (1) contains the entrepreneurial exposure at the host and
the home country plus the year dummies. In column (2) the socio-demographic
and individual characteristics are included. First I focus on the variables of
interest and later I discuss the results for the control variables.
From the first two columns of Table 2.4 it is observed that entrepreneurial
exposure in United States has a positive effect on the probability to remit for
business and is statistically different from zero. Whereas the entrepreneurial
exposure in Mexico has a negative coefficient although it is not significant. An-
other noticeable difference is that the effect of entrepreneurial exposure abroad
is considerably larger than the one of entrepreneurial exposure at home. If we
interpret the results from this estimation -without controlling for states fixed
effects- we wrongly conclude that on average one point increase in the exposure
to entrepreneurship abroad leads to a 40% increase in the probability to remit
for business purposes, whereas the entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico has no
effect on remitting for businesses. However, the data level disaggregation of the
EMIF allows to control for states level fixed effects. The ENADID only reg-
isters the state an individual migrate to, and the MMP records metropolitan
statistical areas, which may be comprised of two or more counties of different
states. As a result is not possible to control for differences across states in
United States using those datasets.
In column (3) a set of dummies for the states of Mexico and United States
70
are included. Thus, column (3) eliminates unobservable across-state differ-
ences and restricts variation within each state over time. From this estimation
it can be observed that the coefficient of entrepreneurial exposure in United
States decreases by more than three-quarters compared to column (2) from
0.402 to 0.061 and loses significance. Furthermore, the coefficient for the
entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico changes from -0.027 to -0.038 and be-
comes statistically different from zero. Namely, one point increase in the en-
trepreneurial exposure in Mexico on average decreases the probability to remit
for business purposes by 2.7%.
These differences in the estimation results highlights the importance of
using county and municipality level data allowing to include states fixed ef-
fects. The comparison of columns (2) and (3) on the variables of interests
suggest that the states fixed effects are capturing some bias affecting the re-
sults. Before the states fixed effects, the entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico
was downward biased whereas the entrepreneurial exposure in United States
was upward biased. In specific, when controlling separately for Mexican and
American states the estimations results suggest that US states are the ones
driving the results.11
One way to better understand the systematic differences across states that
are not captured by the observables is by plotting the fixed effect coefficients.
Figure 2.1 shows the plots of the US states fixed effects coefficients, with 90 and
95% confidence intervals.12 The baseline is the state with the lowest number
of Mexican business owners as well as Mexican population, Mississippi. The
states are ordered by regions and from the coefficient plots it is observed that
11Estimations not reported in this chapter.
12Some states were omitted in the regression due to insufficient observations: Alaska, Con-
necticut, Delaware, D.C., Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wyoming.
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Table 2.4: Probit AME - Effect of entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico and
United States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EMX -0.0293 -0.0268 -0.0381∗ -0.0515∗∗
(0.0224) (0.0209) (0.0199) (0.0274)
EUS 0.4062∗∗∗ 0.4018∗∗∗ 0.0608 0.0439
(0.1394) (0.1309) (0.1166) (0.1505)
Age 0.0003 0.0003 0.000351
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Male 0.0201∗∗∗ 0.0171∗∗ 0.0166∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0079) (0.0080)
Married -0.0036 -0.0038 -0.00299
(0.0045) (0.0049 ) (0.0048)
High sch 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0166∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0040) (0.0046)
Illegal 0.0049 0.0067 0.00812
(0.0046) (0.0043) (0.0050)
3-5 YSM 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0064)
6-10 YSM 0.0076 0.0098∗ 0.00857
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0066)
11-20 YSM 0.0099∗ 0.0133∗∗ 0.0140∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0060)
21 or more YSM -0.0098 -0.0040 -0.00294
(0.0057) (0.0052) (0.0077)
NFE 0.0027∗∗ 0.0019 0.00178
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0015)
N 15680 15680 15581 13177
Year FE X X X X
Mx States FE X X
US States FE X X
Mx*US States FE X
Clusters c,m c,m c,m c,m
Notes: The sample includes migrants between 16-70 years old who worked
in the United States and reported the purposes for sending remittances. The
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the
migrant ever send money for business purposes and 0 if the migrants send
money for any other reason. The entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico is mea-
sured as the ratio of people self-employed over the population force in a given
municipality. The entrepreneurial exposure in United States is calculated as
the ratio of Mexican business owners over the total Mexican population on a
county. Year fixed effects contain indicator variables for the surveyed years,
1999-2012, where 1999 is the baseline. US and Mexican states fixed effects
only contain dummies for the states with localities where migrants reported to
live. Some observations are dropped due to model underidentification when
including the states fixed effects. All estimations are two-way clustered at
municipality and county level. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure 2.1: Estimated US States Fixed Effects
Figure 2.2: Estimated Mexican States Fixed Effects
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states in the west region have the highest fixed effects followed by those in
the south, whereas the north-east region has the lowest fixed effects. It is
very likely that this fixed effects are picking up the self-selection of Mexican
migrants into specific states of United States situated along the border and
west of US. According to the 2000 and 2010 US censuses, Mexican migrants
are highly concentrated in the west and south regions, more specifically in the
states of Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. Thus, fixed
effects help to control for the self-selection of Mexican migrants into states in
the United States.
With regards to the Mexican states fixed effect results, the baseline is Baja
California since it has the lowest rate of self-employment.13 Figure 2.2 shows
the coefficients for Mexican states fixed effects, the states are ordered according
to their level of migration. The states with a coefficient statistically different
from zero come from states with medium or high levels of migration, with the
exception of Campeche and Tlaxcala.
Moreover the estimation on column (4) controls for years, Mexican states,
American states, and the interaction between the last two. The results are
even stronger when controlling for the pair Mexican-American states. It is
observed a larger and negative coefficient for the entrepreneurial exposure at
home -0.052, and it gains significance. On the contrary, the coefficient of the
entrepreneurial exposure in the United States decreases even more 0.044, and
remains insignificant. Thus, from column (4) we can infer that the states
where migrants come from and go to are crucial determinant to remit for
business purposes. After controlling for selection the results suggest that only
the exposure to entrepreneurship in Mexico has a significant and negative
effect on the decision to remit for business purposes whereas the exposure to
13Baja California Sur and Quintana Roo are omitted in the regression due to insufficient
observations.
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entrepreneurship in United States has no impact on migrants’ intentions to
get involved in entrepreneurial activities. On average one point increase in the
entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico leads to a 5.2% decrease in the probability
to remit for business purposes.
With respect to the control variables, I observe that age has no effect on
the decision to send remittances for business purposes neither the migrant’s
marital status. Regarding gender, males are more likely to remit for business
purposes than females. As to education, migrants with seven or more years
of education tend to remit more for business reasons. This result contrast
with Wahba and Zenou (2012) and McCormick and Wahba (2001) who find
that for returnee migrants the level of education is negatively related to the
probability to become entrepreneur. Regarding illegal migrants, the positive
sign suggest that migrants who crossed the border illegally (without legal
documents) are more likely to send money for business motives. Contrary to
Fairlie and Woodruff (2008), they find that among Mexican migrants the rate
of business ownership is lower for those who are illegally residing in United
States. Years since migration accounts for the number of years from the first
time the migrant crossed to the United States to work until the year of the
survey. The baseline category is from zero to two years of migration, that is,
new migrants. It can be observed that mainly all categories are positive and
significant with exception of more experienced migrants who have 21 or more
years since first migrated and are less likely to remit for business purposes
compared to recent migrants. Finally, the number of family earners has the
expected sign but is not statistically significant.
The results of entrepreneurial exposure at the home and host country are
robust using OLS and Logit estimations, in the Appendix, tables 2.8 and
2.9 show the results respectively. Both tables show the same specifications
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described before, column (1) includes the entrepreneurial exposure at both
the host and home country and years fixed effects and in column (2) the socio-
demographic variables are added. Columns (3) and (4) incorporate state fixed
effects for both countries and column (4) includes the interaction of these.
The variables of interest show similar results. The entrepreneurial exposure
in Mexico has a negative and non-significant effect on the decision to remit
for business purposes before controlling for selection, after including states
fixed effects the coefficient is more negative and significant. Whereas the
entrepreneurial exposure in United States before controlling for selection has
a positive and significant effect but it decreases and becomes insignificant after
controlling for selection.
I also explore the presence of non-linear effects on both exposures to en-
trepreneurship, however the results did not support this relationship. For the
estimation controlling by-origin-and-destination fixed effects, the entrepreneurial
exposure in Mexico showed a negative sign on both terms whereas the expo-
sure in United States showed a positive effect at first and negative for the
quadratic term but none of them significantly different from zero.
2.3.2 Entrepreneurial exposure of non-Mexicans and Lati-
nos in the United States
I use both the entrepreneurial exposure of Latinos and non-Mexicans in the
United States, to test whether a broader entrepreneurial exposure at the host
country have an influence on migrants’ decisions to remit for business pur-
poses. Like Mexicans, Latinos also share similar cultures and traditions. One
fundamental factor making Mexican and Latinos more likely to interact is the
language. Especially if Mexican migrants are not fluent in English, this might
facilitate to make links with other Latino migrants in the same situation. Us-
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Table 2.5: Probit AME - Effect of entrepreneurial networks in Mexico and
Latinos in the Unitesd States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EMX -0.0312 -0.0285 -0.0383∗ -0.0518∗∗
0.0226 0.0211 0.0200 (0.2006)
EUSL 0.4612
∗∗∗ 0.4473∗∗∗ 0.1249 0.0911
0.1417 0.1361 0.1373 (1.4111)
Age 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
0.0002 0.0002 (0.0022)
Male 0.0198∗∗ 0.0172∗∗ 0.0168sym*
0.0082 0.0079 (0.0791)
Married -0.0035 -0.0037 -0.0027
0.0045 0.0049 (0.0555)
High sch 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗
0.0045 0.0040 (0.0450)
Illegal 0.0047 0.0067 0.0083∗
0.0046 0.0043 (0.0438)
3-5 YSM 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗
0.0050 0.0046 (0.0532)
6-10 YSM 0.0074 0.0099∗∗ 0.0079
0.0051 0.0051 (0.0544)
11-20 YSM 0.0100∗ 0.0133∗∗ 0.0140∗∗
0.0057 0.0054 (0.0562)
21 or more YSM -0.0096∗ -0.0040 -0.0023
0.0058 0.0052 (0.0552)
NFE 0.0027∗∗ 0.0019 0.0018
0.0013 0.0014 (0.0146)
N 15680 15680 15581 13177
Year FE X X X X
Mx States FE X X
US States FE X X
Mx*US States FE X
Clusters c,m c,m c,m c,m
Notes: The sample includes migrants between 16-70 years old who worked in the
United States and reported the purposes for sending remittances. The dependent
variable is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the migrant ever
send money for business purposes and 0 if the migrants send money for any
other reason. The entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico is measured as the ratio
of people self-employed over the population force in a given municipality. The
entrepreneurial exposure of Latinos in United States is calculated as the ratio
of Latino business owners over the total Latino population on a county. Year
fixed effects contain indicator variables for the surveyed years, 1999-2012, where
1999 is the baseline. US and Mexican states fixed effects only contain dummies
for the states with localities where migrants reported to live. Some observations
are dropped due to model underidentification when including the states fixed
effects. All estimations are two-way clustered at municipality and county level.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.6: Probit AME - Effect of entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico and
non-Mexicans in United States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EMX -0.0301 -0.0265 -0.0383∗ -0.0518∗∗
0.0225 0.0209 0.0201 (0.2013)
EUSNMX 0.0843 0.0987 0.1233 0.0890
0.1497 0.1419 0.0882 (0.8864)
Age 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
0.0002 0.0002 (0.0021)
Male 0.0193∗∗ 0.0172∗∗ 0.0169∗
0.0082 0.0080 (0.0796)
Married -0.0037 -0.0036 -0.0026
0.0045 0.0050 (0.0556)
High sch 0.0173∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗
0.0046 0.0040 (0.0448)
Illegal 0.0040 0.0065 0.0081∗
0.0047 0.0043 (0.0437)
3-5 YSM 0.0191∗∗∗ 0.0203∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗
0.0051 0.0046 (0.0533)
6-10 YSM 0.0064 0.0098∗∗ 0.0079
0.0052 0.0050 (0.0541)
11-20 YSM 0.0089∗ 0.0132∗∗ 0.0139∗∗
0.0055 0.0054 (0.0557)
21 or more YSM -0.0113∗ -0.0041 -0.0024
0.0062 0.0052 (0.0557)
NFE 0.0028∗∗ 0.0019 0.0018
0.0013 0.0014 (0.0146)
N 15680 15680 15581 13177
Year FE X X X X
Mx States FE X X
US States FE X X
Mx*US States FE X
Clusters c,m c,m c,m c,m
Notes: The sample includes migrants between 16-70 years old who worked
in the United States and reported the purposes for sending remittances.
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1
if the migrant ever send money for business purposes and 0 if the migrants
send money for any other reason. The entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico
is measured as the ratio of people self-employed over the population force in
a given municipality. The entrepreneurial exposure non-Mexicans in United
States is calculated as the ratio of non-Mexican business owners over the
total of non-Mexican population on a county. Year fixed effects contain
indicator variables for the surveyed years, 1999-2012, where 1999 is the
baseline. US and Mexican states fixed effects only contain dummies for the
states with localities where migrants reported to live. Some observations are
dropped due to model underidentification when including the states fixed
effects. All estimations are two-way clustered at municipality and county
level. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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ing the entrepreneurial exposure of Latinos in the United States I find very
similar results as with the entrepreneurial exposure of Mexicans in the United
States.
The estimations are included in Table 2.5, where the entrepreneurial expo-
sure in Mexico and the entrepreneurial exposure of Latinos in United States
are included. The specification of each column is as before, column (1) and (2)
only include year dummies, column (3) includes Mexican and American states
fixed effects, and column (4) adds the interaction between states fixed effects.
The entrepreneurial exposure of Latinos has a positive and significant effect on
the probability to remit for business purposes before controlling for selection.
Once the states fixed effects are included, the coefficient EUSL drops and
losses significance as in the estimations shown in Table 2.4 for entrepreneurial
exposure of Mexicans in United States EUS. In contrast to the EUS, the
entrepreneurial exposure of Latinos in the United States have a larger impact.
Regarding the entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico, the coefficient shows sim-
ilar patterns as in previous estimations. For the final estimation, one point
increase in the exposure in Mexico on average leads to a decrease on the like-
lihood to remit for business purposes of 5.2%.
In the case of the entrepreneurial exposure of non-Mexicans in the United
States the same estimations are presented in Table 2.6. The results show
a positive although non significant relationship with the likelihood to remit
for business purposes. Unlike previous results with the other entrepreneurial
exposures, after controlling for selection the change in the coefficient is not dra-
matic. Moreover, compared to previous results from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 the co-
efficient instead of decreasing it increases, although is not statistically different
from zero. The results from a broader exposure suggest that entrepreneurial
exposure from Latinos behave very similar to Mexican entrepreneurial expo-
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sure and even have a larger effect. Failing to control for selection would have
generated biased results. However, for the non-Mexican entrepreneurial expo-
sure this might not be the case since the results do not change much when
including state fixed effects.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
Research on the determinants of entrepreneurial migrants its a growing liter-
ature. These studies focus mainly on the factors that affect entrepreneurship
at the place of origin and at the place of destination separately. Moreover, the
literature suggests that a person’s local environment such as entrepreneurial
neighbourhoods affect positively the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur.
This study contributes to this literature by investigating the entrepreneurial
exposure at both the host and the home country as determinants of migrants’
intentions to get involved in entrepreneurial activities.
The results suggest that the entrepreneurial environment where migrants
resided affect the probability to send money for business motives. Specifically,
after controlling for selection I find that the entrepreneurial exposure in Mex-
ico has a negative effect on migrants’ decision to remit for business purposes,
whereas the entrepreneurial exposure in the United States has no effect on
migrants’ intentions to get involved in entrepreneurial activities. Controlling
for selection was crucial since failing to account for selection leads to biased
results. In particular, the entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico was downward
biased whereas the entrepreneurial exposure in United States was upward bi-
ased.
The Mexican government implemented the programme 3x1 for Migrants
where the government has helped migrants’ initiatives to carry out projects of
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social infrastructure, community services, educative projects and productive
projects. Under this last category the projects could be at community level,
family (2-4 families), individual (1 family), or business training. Migrants have
to form an organization or club of at least 10 migrants and they will decide in
which of the projects mentioned above want to invest, the different levels of
government will triplicate the remittances, hence the name 3x1. Unfortunately,
this programme is just intended for organizations or clubs of migrants, making
it more difficult for those migrants who do not belong to a club or want to start
a small business on their own (without partners). Policy-makers should also
consider policies or implement a programme that helps individual migrants to
start up or expand a business, specially in areas where self-employment is low.
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2.5 Appendix
Table 2.7: Main and additional motivations to remit
Main Independently
Mean SD Mean SD
Buy land 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.17
Business 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.23
Buy-repair house 0.11 0.31 0.34 0.47
Buy car 0.01 0.08 0.13 0.33
Pay debts 0.07 0.25 0.45 0.50
Food and/or rent 0.74 0.44 0.86 0.35
Other 0.04 0.21 0.10 0.30
N 15,677 11,936
Note: Although through all the years of the survey, the main motivation to
remit was recorded, three migrants did not report their main reason to remit
but responded they remitted for business purposes when asked independently.
For this reason, the sample for main motivation is 15,677 rather than 15,680.
Table 2.7 summarizes the main and additional reasons why migrants send
money back home. The first columns only take into account the main reason
migrants gave as to why they send money. In the first place, migrants send
money mainly to buy food and/or pay the house rent, almost 75% reported to
remit for this purpose. On the same line, followed in ranking by importance
11% of the migrants send money either to buy a house or make improvements
in the current house. The 2% of remitters reported that the money sent was
mainly used to expand an actual business or either to buy or establish a new
business. The second part of Table 2.7 reports the additional motivations to
remit, from these columns its observed that the three more recurrent reasons
to remit are to buy food and/or pay rent, to pay debts, and to buy or repair
the house. 5% of those who sent money remitted for business purposes.
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Table 2.8: OLS estimates-Effect of entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico and
United States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EMX -0.0261 -0.0237 -0.0340∗ -0.0405∗∗
(0.0208) (0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0198)
EUS 0.4852∗∗∗ 0.4885∗∗∗ 0.0390 0.0063
(0.1598) (0.1501) (0.1535) (0.1491)
Age 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Male 0.0187∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗ 0.0134∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0067)
Married -0.0041 -0.0044 -0.0033
(0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0055)
High sch 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0043)
Illegal 0.0059 0.0073 0.0069
(0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0046)
3-5 YSM 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0221∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0063)
6-10 YSM 0.0077 0.0094∗ 0.0075
(0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0055)
11-20 YSM 0.0103∗ 0.0129∗∗ 0.0122∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0053) (0.0054)
21 or more YSM -0.0083 -0.0037 -0.0031
(0.0051) (0.0046) (0.0047)
NFE 0.0028∗∗ 0.0019 0.0015
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015)
N 15680 15680 15678 15443
R2 0.010 0.014 0.024 0.070
Year FE X X X X
Mx States FE X X
US States FE X X
Mx*US States FE X
Clusters c,m c,m c,m c,m
Notes: The sample includes migrants between 16-70 years old who worked
in the United States and reported the purposes for sending remittances. The
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the
migrant ever send money for business purposes and 0 if the migrants send
money for any other reason. The entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico is mea-
sured as the ratio of people self-employed over the population force in a given
municipality. The entrepreneurial exposure in United States is calculated as
the ratio of Mexican business owners over the total Mexican population on a
county. Year fixed effects contain indicator variables for the surveyed years,
1999-2012, where 1999 is the baseline. US and Mexican states fixed effects
only contain dummies for the states with localities where migrants reported to
live. Some observations are dropped due to model underidentification when
including the states fixed effects. All estimations are two-way clustered at
municipality and county level. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.9: Logit AME -Effect of entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico and
United States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EMX -0.0051 -0.0057 -0.0108∗ -0.0539∗
0.0046 0.0050 0.0065 (0.0288)
EUS 0.0699∗∗∗ 0.0788∗∗∗ 0.0096 0.00498
0.0327 0.0340 0.0284 (0.1451)
Age 0.0001 0.0001 0.000364
0.0000 0.0001 (0.0003)
Male 0.0042∗∗ 0.0046∗∗ 0.0180∗∗
0.0022 0.0024 (0.0088)
Married -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.00313
0.0010 0.0014 (0.0050)
High sch 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0173∗∗∗
0.0014 0.0013 (0.0048)
Illegal 0.0011 0.0019 0.00825
0.0010 0.0012 (0.0051)
3-5 YSM 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗
0.0014 0.0014 (0.0065)
6-10 YSM 0.0016 0.0027∗ 0.00930
0.0011 0.0015 (0.0067)
11-20 YSM 0.0021∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗
0.0013 0.0017 (0.0062)
21 or more YSM -0.0019∗ -0.0012 -0.00370
0.0014 0.0015 (0.0081)
NFE 0.0006∗∗ 0.0005 0.00183
0.0003 0.0004 (0.0015)
N 15680 15680 15581 13177
Year FE X X X X
Mx States FE X X
US States FE X X
Mx*US States FE X
Clusters c,m c,m c,m c,m
Notes: The sample includes migrants between 16-70 years old who worked
in the United States and reported the purposes for sending remittances. The
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the
migrant ever send money for business purposes and 0 if the migrants send
money for any other reason. The entrepreneurial exposure in Mexico is mea-
sured as the ratio of people self-employed over the population force in a given
municipality. The entrepreneurial exposure in United States is calculated as
the ratio of Mexican business owners over the total Mexican population on a
county. Year fixed effects contain indicator variables for the surveyed years,
1999-2012, where 1999 is the baseline. US and Mexican states fixed effects
only contain dummies for the states with localities where migrants reported to
live. Some observations are dropped due to model underidentification when
including the states fixed effects. All estimations are two-way clustered at
municipality and county level. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Chapter 3
Mexican Remittances: A brief
literature review
Miriam Saldan˜a Herna´ndez
Abstract
In this paper I analyse relevant aspects regarding the impact of Mexican remit-
tances. The literature suggest that remittances reduce inequality and poverty
in communities with strong historical migration, while they increase in com-
munities with low migration levels. The effects on education are inconsistent,
however, child health improves when remittances are received. Moreover, re-
mittances decrease the labour supply of households receiving remittances. In
contrast, remittances have a positive effect on the development and creation
of business. The determinants of remittances are also analysed.
JEL classification: F22, F24, J61
Key words: Remittances, Mexican migrants, determinants
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Introduction
Over the last few decades remittances have grown steadily. Remittances in
the world reached to 553.975 US billions in 2015, the highest amount regis-
tered by the World Bank. In 1975 the amount of remittances totalled 10.203
US billions, and Italy was the largest recipient country followed by Spain and
Turkey. Nowadays, the top five recipient countries are India, China, Philip-
pines, Mexico, and France, altogether these countries receive around 35% of
remittances inflow.1 Moreover, the largest migration corridor in the world is
Mexico-United States. According to the Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, for 2015 Mexican migrants represent almost the 26% of the migrant
population in the United States. The importance of Mexican migration to
United States has been widely studied, specially its impact on the labour mar-
ket. OECD (2009) reports that by 2008 the number of Mexican immigrants
employed represented around 4.5% of the labour force in the United States,
which contributes largely to the US economic growth.
Remittances can have a significant economic impact on the receiving coun-
try, specially for developing ones like Mexico. In this study I review literature
about the effects of remittances on various aspects of Mexico’s development.
In particular, remittances can affect the redistribution of income and poverty
levels. Moreover, literature about child education and health is discussed.
Furthermore, I analyse evidence suggesting that the inflow of remittances can
affect the labour market and entrepreneurship at the home country.
Given the significant impact of remittances, it is also important to under-
stand what determines migrants’ decisions to remit. Evidence for the Mexican
case suggests that socio-demographic factors such as gender, age, and educa-
1The World Bank, Personal remittances received (current US) https://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?end=2016&start=2016&year high desc=true
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tion level as well as community characteristics are the main determinants of
remittances.
In the following section I describe some characteristics of the actual inflow
of remittances in Mexico as well as some statistics about the largest a lowest
recipient states within the country. Next, I point out some literature regarding
the impact of remittances on development. Last, the determinants of Mexican
remittances found in the literature are presented. The last section contains
some final remarks.
3.1 Mexican Remittances
In 2016 Mexico was the largest recipient country of remittances in Latin Amer-
ica by receiving 28.7 US billions. Meanwhile, worldwide Mexico ranked fourth
according to World Bank statistics. Mexican remittances are a result of the mi-
gratory phenomenon between Mexico and the United States. This migratory
process began around the middle of the 20th century, when Mexican workers
moved to United States to cover the shortage of labour during the Second
World War.
For over 20 years the Mexican Farm Labour Programme was held between
these countries, allowing the legal entry of Mexican workers to temporarily
work in the United States, mostly in the agricultural sector. This programme,
commonly known as Braceros, ended in 1964. As of its completion, Mexican
workers started to cross the frontier illegally to look for a job. Furthermore,
some of the temporal workers under the Braceros programme where allowed
by the government to stay legally in the United States. As a result of these
events and the geographical proximity of both countries, the creation of mi-
gratory patterns began. One factor that might affect migration patterns is the
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implementation of regularization programs.2 However, Orrenius and Zavodny
(2003) study the effect of amnesty programs such as the 1986 Immigration Re-
form and Control Act (IRCA) on undocumented migration and their findings
suggest that IRCA has no impact on the long-term pattern of undocumented
Mexican migrants. Similar results are found by Donato et al. (1992), their
evidence suggests that IRCA has not changed the undocumented migration
from Mexico.
According to Ratha et al. (2016), the migration corridor Mexico-United
States is the largest in the world. By 2015, 98% of Mexicans living outside
Mexico resided in the United States, according to the United Nations. Fur-
thermore, for the same year Mexican migrants constitute almost 26% of the
migrant population in the United States.3 Since the 80’s Mexicans represent
the largest immigrant group for this country. Moreover, Ratha et al. (2016)
also show that the United States-Mexico remittance corridor is the largest
worldwide with an inflow of 25.2 US billions in 2015. Table 3.1 shows the re-
mittances received by state and their correspondent percent distribution. Also
it shows the flow of emigration to United States between 2004 and 2009 by
state and the Absolute Migration Intensity Index (IAIM), 2010. The IAIM
is based on the percentage of dwellings with remittances, emigrants, circular
migrants, and returning migrants; the ranking is an overall summary of these.
The top three states receiving remittances are Michoacan, Guanajuato, and
Jalisco all three located west-central of Mexico, altogether these states receive
almost 30% of the annual remittances flow. Furthermore, these states along
with Veracruz are also the ones with highest emigration flow to the United
States. On the contrary, the states expelling less migrants to the United States
2According to Donald (2010) the Immigration Reform and Control Act is the largest
legislation program since 1986.
3Department of Economic and Social Affairs. http://www.un.org/en/development/
desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml
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Table 3.1: Emigration and remittances flows in Mexico
State Emigration IAIM Remittances Remittances
flow Ranking Million USD %
Total 1,639,814 - 24,784.77 100.00
Aguascalientes 20,171 23 349.87 1.41
Baja California 48,940 7 681.23 2.75
Baja California Sur 1,833 31 51.25 0.21
Campeche 5,991 32 56.45 0.23
Coahuila 15,719 14 387.12 1.57
Colima 12,795 29 219.27 0.89
Chiapas 67,826 24 593.56 2.40
Chihuahua 52,156 8 643.58 2.59
Ciudad de Mexico 43,391 5 1,090.27 4.40
Durango 28,971 22 533.60 2.15
Estado de Mexico 66,954 3 1,561.15 6.31
Guanajuato 142,691 1 2,263.50 9.12
Guerrero 79,742 15 1,277.74 5.16
Hidalgo 81,961 12 725.53 2.93
Jalisco 129,966 4 2,218.58 8.97
Michoacan 179,498 2 2,531.99 10.23
Morelos 26,383 25 551.07 2.23
Nayarit 12,769 20 399.72 1.61
Nuevo Leon 43,410 18 644.43 2.60
Oaxaca 83,386 11 1,289.40 5.21
Puebla 82,130 10 1,371.27 5.53
Queretaro 43,668 19 460.12 1.85
Quintana Roo 6,505 27 117.43 0.48
San Luis Potosi 40,868 9 849.43 3.42
Sinaloa 34,404 16 533.24 2.15
Sonora 32,421 21 375.84 1.52
Tabasco 9,154 30 130.17 0.53
Tamaulipas 29,773 17 665.00 2.68
Tlaxcala 17,627 28 224.88 0.91
Veracruz 141,174 6 1,086.14 4.38
Yucatan 12,314 26 134.68 0.55
Zacatecas 45,223 13 767.27 3.10
Source: Bank of Mexico, Workers’ remittances income, (percent) distribution by state
2015. Yearbook of migration and remittances Mexico, 2017.
93
are Tabasco, Campeche, and Estado de Mexico, while the states receiving the
lowest flow of remittances are Baja California Sur, Campeche, and Quintana
Roo.
3.1.1 Why are Mexican remittances important?
Remittances are a fundamental income source for the recipient families, which
are mostly low-middle and low-class families. Moreover, remittances are spent
on products of the basic market basket, such as food and clothing; but also
a large share is used to pay debts (CONAPO, 2017). Several studies analyse
the impact of remittances on diverse aspects of development. In what follows,
some studies that address these topics are reviewed.
3.1.1.1 Inequality and Poverty
One of the first papers to analyse remittances’ effect on inequality is the paper
of Stark et al. (1986). They use household data from both internal and interna-
tional remittances as well as non-remittances income from two villages in the
state of Michoacan with different migration patterns. The first village has low
levels of migration to the United States while the second has more tradition
sending migrants abroad. Their findings suggest that the impact on inequality
depends on the villages’ migration history. For the village with low migration
level, remittances increase inequality. This is due to the higher migration costs
that households face compared to the other village. These households invest-
ing in migration are more likely to be those from the village’s upper income
distribution, therefore the unequalising effect of remittances in this village.
However, for the village with high migration, remittances have a positive out-
come reducing inequality among the village members. In this case, migration
costs are lower because the number of experienced contacts in the village can
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help and provide information that ease migration, even for those at the bottom
distribution of the village.
In a later paper (Stark et al., 1988), they study the robustness of their
results by using different distributional weights when calculating an extended
Gini index. Stark et al. (1988) find that households at the bottom of the
income distribution face entry barriers to migration work when more weight
is applied to these households. Like these, there is a large number of studies
analysing the effect of remittances on inequality for rural areas. Taylor (1992)
and Taylor and Wyatt (1996), find that remittances besides affecting inequality
they also lighten credit constraints on household farm production.
Using a larger household dataset which includes 1,782 rural households
from 14 states, Taylor et al. (2005) ivestigate the impact of migration and re-
mittances on inequality and poverty. They find that both the equalizing effects
of remittances and alleviating poverty are larger in regions with migration his-
tory, that is, regions where the share of migrant households is large. These
results reinforce the findings of Stark et al. (1986). Arslan and Taylor (2012)
using a household panel data which allow them to control for time-invariant
variables find similar results.
De la Fuente (2010) instead of analysing the impact of remittances in
poverty, he investigates whether remittances are sent to individuals more likely
to be more vulnerable in the future. De la Fuente (2010) uses household panel
data from 506 most deprived rural localities in Mexico. By instrumenting the
vulnerability to poverty with rainfall distribution, this study finds a negative
relationship between remittances sent and households’ vulnerability to future
poverty.
Furthermore, McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) study the relationship be-
tween emigration and inequality. They use two representative Mexican sur-
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veys the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) consisting of 57 rural communities
with high rates of migration, and the National demographic dynamics survey
(ENADID) with information of 214 rural communities. Controlling for unob-
served community factors correlated with migration decisions and inequality,
using state-level migration rates, they find an inverse U-shaped relationship
between migration and inequality. For communities in the MMP with high
levels of migration they find that migration leads to a reduction in inequality,
whereas for communities in the ENADID with more disperse levels of migra-
tion inequality increases at lower migration rates.
3.1.1.2 Health and Education
In a developing country such as Mexico, the remittances received by house-
holds can play an important role on health and education. Many studies have
analysed these relationships often finding mixed evidence. Due to data avail-
ability, studies from Mexico analyse the impact of remittances in child health
and education.
Co´rdova (2006) study the effect of the fraction of remittance-receiving
households on children’s schooling and health status. In addition to a rich
set of controls, to address for endogeneity they use the municipal rainfall pat-
tern and distance to the state of Guadalajara as instrumental variables. Their
results suggest that a higher fraction of remittance-receiving households have
a positive impact on children’s education and health by reducing illiteracy and
infant mortality. Additionally, remittances increase school attendance among
children 5 years old, but decrease attendance among teenagers between 15-17
years old.
Hildebrandt et al. (2005) find that migration has a negative relationship
with infant mortality and increases birth weights. They suggest that an ob-
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vious channel affecting child health through migration is an increase in the
household income.
The paper by Alcaraz et al. (2012) uses panel data from the Mexican Na-
tional Occupation and Employment Survey (ENOE). They exploit the impact
of the 2008 recession on Mexican immigrants employment status and therefore
on remittances received by Mexican households and analyse if the decrease in
remittances lead children to drop out from school and start to work. Estimat-
ing a differences-in-differences model,4 they find that a shock in remittances
lead to an decrease in school attendance and an increase in the incidence of
child labour.
Anylising the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH)
Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2007) their results indicate that remittances increase
the healthcare expenditure, in particular hospitalization and primary care. In
a later paper, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2011) find evidence suggesting that
remittances might help to equalise healthcare expenditures among households
lacking healthcare coverage and those with it.
3.1.1.3 Labour Market and Entrepreneurship
Most of the studies analyse the impact of migration on the labour market
focusing on the effects in the host country rather than at the home country.
Moreover, little is know about the effects that remittances have on the home
country labour market. Similarly, how migrants’ entrepreneurial activities are
affected by remittances is under-explored. The studies analysing the Mex-
ican case find that remittances promote entrepreneurial activities, however,
remittances often reduce the labour supply.
4The treatment group are children between 12-16 years old in households receiving re-
mittances in a given period. In contrast, the control group consist of kids of the same age
residing in households that did not receive remittances.
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Hanson (2007) studies the role of migration and remittances on Mexican
labour force participation using data from Mexico’s censuses in 1990 and 2000.
In particular, he finds that individuals are less likely to enter the labour force if
they are members of a household which receives remittances or has a migrant
abroad, although his results suffer from potential self-selection. Using a sample
more likely to address for unobservables, Hanson (2007) find that women from
states with high migration rates are less likely to work outside the home,
relatively to women living in states with lower migration rates.
Using data from the ENIGH, another paper studying the effect of remit-
tances received on the labour supply is Airola (2008). Similarly, his results
suggest that remittances lower the labour supply by decreasing the number of
hours worked per week. Using also the ENIGH, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo
(2006a) argue that the labour supplies of men and women might respond dif-
ferently to remittances, as well as the impact they have on rural and urban
areas. They explore how employment type and hours worked change in these
groups when receiving remittances. Addressing for endogeneity of the out-
come, they find that the hours worked increase or decrease at different type
of work, gender, and local area. In specific, for males in both areas rural and
urban, formal work decreases while informal increases, and self-employment
decreases only in urban areas. Regarding females, only informal and non-paid
work is negatively affected in rural areas.
Cox-Edwards and Rodr´ıguez-Oreggia (2009) focus on persistent remit-
tances rather than sporadic since they argue that persistent remittances are
more likely to modify the behaviour of recipients while the sporadic might be
the result of particular circumstances such as labour force status. They use
a propensity score matching with quarterly employment data collected with
a migration module taking place for the first and only time by the National
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Quarterly Employment Survey. By comparing the labour force participation of
remittances recipients with non-recipients, they find little evidence suggesting
that persistent remittances affect labour force participation. The only sub-
group where they find differences in labour participation is on women from
urban areas with low migration history, in particular, these women increase
their labour participation when the household receives persistent remittances.
Massey and Parrado (1998) use data collected from rural municipalities
located in states with high migration history. They focus on male household
heads to study the effect of savings and remittances on business creation.
Controlling for selection, their results suggest that altogether remittances and
savings increase individuals’ likelihood of business creation.
Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) investigate the capital constraint on invest-
ment faced by microenterprises, emphasizing on the role of remittances have to
overcome capital constraints. For this purpose, they use the National Survey
of Microenterprises. They conclude that remittances are an important source
of capital for the development of microenterprises, specially for those situated
in urban areas.
3.1.2 What determines remittances?
Literature about the determinants of remittances is extensive, Carling (2008)
and Hagen-Zanker and Siegel (2007) present a review of the factors affecting
migrants’ intentions to remit and/or the amount remitted worldwide. Among
the main socio-demographic determinants found are: migrants’ income, edu-
cation level, age, legal status, gender, marital status, place of origin, household
size (home and abroad), and time spent abroad. In some cases, there are incon-
sistent results. For instance, for migrants’ income and education level some
studies find a positive relationship while others find not effect at all. How-
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ever, other effects are well established such as being male or married increases
remittances, whereas the household size in the host country has a negative
relationship.
For the Mexican case, Durand et al. (1996) investigate the determinants of
migrants’ savings and remittances at different tiers, such as macroeconomic,
community, household and individual level. They use random samples col-
lected in 30 communities during December and January of 1982-1983 and
1987-1992 in the states of Jalisco, Guanajuato, Nayarit, Michoacan, and Za-
catecas; also non-random samples of out-migrants were gathered in the United
States.
They estimate both the probability to remit and the amount remitted.
Their results suggest that migrants are more likely to remit the older their
working age is, if are married, with the cost of coyote,5 and if the community
of origin has a large share of self-employment; but less likely to remit with years
of schooling and if accompanied by the spouse. The amount of money paid
to be smuggled into the United States increases the probability and amount
remitted, as well as years of schooling, monthly earnings, and duration of the
trip.
Likewise, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006b) analyse the probability and
level of remittances. However, they use five waves from the Survey of Migration
in the Northern Border of Mexico, EMIF, between 1993-2000. In particular,
they find that older migrants and males tend to remit more. Moreover, remit-
tances are positively associated with the number of household members. In
another paper, using data from the MMP Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006c)
find that remittances have an inverted U-shape with respect to time spent in
US. Specifically, after spending over five years abroad the amount of remit-
5Person who smuggles people to the United States along the border.
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tances sent to Mexico starts to decline. The decline is earlier for migrants with
weak ties to Mexico and later for migrants with spouses at the community of
origin (in Mexico).
Soltero (2009), studies the specific case of Mexican-born immigrants in
Chicago. In particular, uses data from a multi-stage probabilistic sample of
510 Mexican immigrants living in Cook County, Illinois. Several new variables
are included to investigate their effect on remittances, such as migrant’s reli-
gion, English proficiency, whether he voted in Mexico and/or United States,
or if he is registered to vote in US, the language used to communicate at home,
school/work, and with friends. However, none of these were statistically sig-
nificant. Among the new variables included that have significant effect was
the preference of the lifestyle in Mexico over Chicago’s, which increased the
likelihood to remit.
3.2 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we review the importance of Mexican remittances. Data sug-
gest that Mexican states receiving a large share of remittances are also the
ones with the highest emigration flow. Although data availability has limita-
tions, the literature suggests that socio-demographic factors such as gender,
age, and education level as well as community characteristics are the main
determinants of remittances.
Moreover, findings about the impact on inequality and poverty suggest
that remittances have different effects depending on the level of migration
from migrant’s locality. Regarding the labour market and entrepreneurship
of migrants, literature suggest that remittances decrease the labour supply of
households receiving remittances. However, remittances have a positive effect
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on the development and creation of business. With respect to education there
is mixed evidence about the effects of remittances. However, child health
improves when remittances are received. Also, some evidence suggest that
remittances increase the healthcare expenditure.
Although the main determinants of remittances have been identified in the
literature, the dynamics of migration and remittances is in constant evolution,
therefore, the possibility to explore new research ideas is open. For exam-
ple, little is know about the political implications remittances can have on the
receiving community. Likewise, migrants residing in different political environ-
ments other thing equal can differ in their remittance behaviour. Moreover,
recent changes on US anti-migration policies can have a direct effect not only
in migration but also on money sent abroad.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I analyse how migrants’ local environment affects their remitting
behaviour. The characteristics of Mexican migration provide a good case of
study, the Mexico-United States migration corridor is the largest in the world
and the remittance corridor has an estimated outflow of US $25.2 billion remit-
tances. Thus, remittances in Mexico are an importance source of income for
migrants’ families as well as for the economy of the country. The determinants
of remittances have been widely studied, however little is know about how the
local environment (i.e. social networks) of migrants affect their remitting be-
haviour. This thesis sheds some light in this regard, taking Mexican migrants
as study case.
For migrants, co-ethnics living abroad are often their first contact point.
They provide valuable information for the migration process as well as help for
new migrants to assimilate in the host country. The clustering of immigrants
provides a peculiar environment in which the interaction with co-ethnics can
influence others decisions. That is precisely what this thesis is focused on.
The first chapter analyses theoretically and empirically how living around
more Mexican migrants in the United States affect migrants’ probability to
remit as well as the amount remitted. After controlling for the endogeneity of
the network, the empirical results suggest that living among more Mexicans
have a negative effect on aforesaid probability and amount of money sent back
107
home. One possible explanation for this is that migrants in larger clusters of co-
ethnics tend to contribute more towards social projects at the host community.
In the second chapter, I analyse how the exposure to entrepreneurship can
affect migrants’ decision to remit for business purposes. Specifically, I investi-
gate how the exposure to Mexican entrepreneurs in both migrants’ localities of
origin and destination affect their intentions to get involved in entrepreneurial
activities. After controlling for selection I find that only the entrepreneurial
exposure at the home country has an impact on the decision to remit, and its
effect is negative.
The last chapter highlights the importance of remittances in the Mexican
context. This chapter also reviews literature regarding the impact of remit-
tances on development as well as to analyse the main determinants leading
Mexican migrants to remit.
Future research should explore beyond the main determinants of remit-
tances considering the current political changes for Mexican migrants. Another
research area unexplored due to data availability are the factors determining
for which purposes migrants remit. Most of the studies in this line use indi-
rect measures to proxy migrants’ motivations to remit. However, new data
provides more direct and precise information about the motives to remit.
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